feat: plan 16-01

2026-07-06 21:47:38 +09:00
parent 4419cd9eae
commit 8c3c5e8bff
30 changed files with 1646 additions and 66 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -uo pipefail
+
+# CASAN Plan-16 SEC-03 (H-03) — rollback-manager: no `bash -c`, structured argv only.
+#
+# The rollback `execute` path used to `bash -c "$rollback_command"` where the
+# command was read from the unsigned transaction log — arbitrary code execution
+# for anyone who can append a line. This proves:
+#   * a genuine checkpoint still restores the file (regression),
+#   * a forged free-form record with an RCE payload is REFUSED (not executed),
+#   * a forged structured record whose backup points outside the controlled
+#     backup dir is REFUSED (cannot copy an arbitrary source file).
+#
+# Deterministic; no model/app/network. Hermetic tx log via a temp workspace.
+
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+PROJECT_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/../.." && pwd)"
+RM="$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/scripts/bash/rollback-manager.sh"
+TX_LOG="$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/logs/level5/rollback-transactions.jsonl"
+WORK="$(mktemp -d)"
+
+# rollback-manager uses a fixed tx-log path; back it up and restore on exit.
+[[ -f "$TX_LOG" ]] && cp -p "$TX_LOG" "$WORK/tx.bak"
+restore_tx() { if [[ -f "$WORK/tx.bak" ]]; then cp -p "$WORK/tx.bak" "$TX_LOG"; else rm -f "$TX_LOG"; fi; }
+trap 'restore_tx; rm -f "$WORK/PWNED"; rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT
+
+PASS=0; FAIL=0
+pass() { echo "PASS: $1"; PASS=$((PASS + 1)); }
+fail() { echo "FAIL: $1"; FAIL=$((FAIL + 1)); }
+rc_of() { set +e; "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1; echo $?; set -e 2>/dev/null || true; }
+
+echo "===== Plan-16 SEC-03: rollback-manager no bash -c (RCE) ====="
+
+# 1) Regression: genuine checkpoint -> execute restores exact content.
+TARGET="$WORK/plan.txt"; echo "ORIGINAL" > "$TARGET"
+TX="$(bash "$RM" checkpoint "$TARGET" | sed -n 's/.*transaction_id=\([^ ]*\).*/\1/p')"
+echo "OVERWRITTEN" > "$TARGET"
+bash "$RM" execute "$TX" >/dev/null 2>&1
+[[ "$(cat "$TARGET")" == "ORIGINAL" ]] \
+  && pass "genuine checkpoint restores exact pre-overwrite content" \
+  || fail "checkpoint did not restore (got: $(cat "$TARGET"))"
+
+# 2) Fail-able: forged free-form record carrying an RCE payload must be REFUSED.
+rm -f "$WORK/PWNED"
+python3 - "$TX_LOG" "$WORK/PWNED" <<'PY'
+import json, sys
+log, marker = sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2]
+open(log, "a", encoding="utf-8").write(json.dumps({
+    "transaction_id": "evil-rce", "action": "checkpoint",
+    "rollback_command": f"touch {marker}"}) + "\n")
+PY
+RC="$(rc_of bash "$RM" execute evil-rce)"
+if [[ "$RC" -ne 0 && ! -f "$WORK/PWNED" ]]; then
+  pass "forged free-form rollback_command REFUSED, no code executed (rc=$RC)"
+else
+  fail "RCE not prevented (rc=$RC, marker exists=$([[ -f "$WORK/PWNED" ]] && echo yes || echo no))"
+fi
+
+# 3) Fail-able: forged restore_file whose backup is outside the controlled dir.
+SECRET="$WORK/secret.txt"; echo "SECRET" > "$SECRET"
+python3 - "$TX_LOG" "$SECRET" "$WORK/stolen.txt" <<'PY'
+import json, sys
+log, backup, target = sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2], sys.argv[3]
+open(log, "a", encoding="utf-8").write(json.dumps({
+    "transaction_id": "evil-src", "action": "checkpoint", "op": "restore_file",
+    "backup": backup, "target": target}) + "\n")
+PY
+RC="$(rc_of bash "$RM" execute evil-src)"
+if [[ "$RC" -ne 0 && ! -f "$WORK/stolen.txt" ]]; then
+  pass "forged restore source outside backup dir REFUSED (rc=$RC)"
+else
+  fail "arbitrary-source restore not prevented (rc=$RC)"
+fi
+
+echo ""
+echo "===== SEC-03 SUMMARY: PASS=$PASS FAIL=$FAIL ====="
+[[ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ]] || exit 1