feat: plan 16-01

2026-07-06 21:47:38 +09:00
parent 4419cd9eae
commit 8c3c5e8bff
30 changed files with 1646 additions and 66 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -uo pipefail
+
+# CASAN Plan-16 SEC-02 (H-02) — no local key auto-generation in enforced mode.
+#
+# The tamper-evidence of the audit chain rests on the head signature. If the
+# signer auto-generates a private key next to the data (as dev convenience does),
+# then any actor who can write the log can also mint a key and re-sign a forged
+# head. In enforced mode the signer must NOT auto-generate — the key is provisioned
+# out-of-band (KMS/HSM). This proves:
+#   * permissive mode still auto-generates a local key (dev convenience),
+#   * enforced mode does NOT create a key when none is provisioned, and the
+#     resulting unsigned head then FAILS strict verification (fail-closed).
+#
+# Deterministic; hermetic (temp key dir + backup/restore of audit + gov dirs).
+
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+PROJECT_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/../.." && pwd)"
+BASH_DIR="$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/scripts/bash"
+WORK="$(mktemp -d)"
+
+BK="$WORK/bak"; mkdir -p "$BK"
+cp -a "$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/logs/audit" "$BK/audit" 2>/dev/null || true
+cp -a "$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/level5/central-governance" "$BK/cg" 2>/dev/null || true
+restore() {
+  rm -rf "$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/logs/audit"; cp -a "$BK/audit" "$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/logs/audit" 2>/dev/null || true
+  rm -rf "$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/level5/central-governance"; cp -a "$BK/cg" "$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/level5/central-governance" 2>/dev/null || true
+}
+trap 'restore; rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT
+
+PASS=0; FAIL=0
+pass() { echo "PASS: $1"; PASS=$((PASS + 1)); }
+fail() { echo "FAIL: $1"; FAIL=$((FAIL + 1)); }
+rc_of() { set +e; "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1; echo $?; set -e 2>/dev/null || true; }
+
+echo "===== Plan-16 SEC-02: no local key auto-gen in enforced mode ====="
+echo "benign input" > "$WORK/in.txt"
+
+# 1) Permissive mode: a fresh key dir auto-generates a local key (dev convenience).
+KD1="$WORK/keys-permissive"
+env CASAN_AUDIT_KEY_DIR="$KD1" bash "$BASH_DIR/governance-check.sh" "$WORK/in.txt" "$WORK/out1.txt" agent_step >/dev/null 2>&1
+[[ -f "$KD1/audit-private.pem" ]] \
+  && pass "permissive mode auto-generates a local signing key" \
+  || fail "permissive mode did not auto-generate a key (dev convenience broken)"
+
+# 2) Enforced mode: a fresh key dir must NOT auto-generate a key.
+KD2="$WORK/keys-enforced"
+env CASAN_VERIFY_STRICT=1 CASAN_AUDIT_KEY_DIR="$KD2" bash "$BASH_DIR/governance-check.sh" "$WORK/in.txt" "$WORK/out2.txt" agent_step >/dev/null 2>&1
+[[ ! -f "$KD2/audit-private.pem" ]] \
+  && pass "enforced mode does NOT auto-generate a local key (H-02 closed)" \
+  || fail "enforced mode auto-generated a local key (attacker could re-sign forgery)"
+
+# 3) The unsigned head produced in enforced mode fails strict verification.
+[[ "$(rc_of env CASAN_VERIFY_STRICT=1 bash "$BASH_DIR/verify-audit-chain.sh")" -ne 0 ]] \
+  && pass "unsigned head from enforced run FAILS strict verify (fail-closed)" \
+  || fail "unsigned head passed strict verify"
+
+echo ""
+echo "===== SEC-02 SUMMARY: PASS=$PASS FAIL=$FAIL ====="
+[[ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ]] || exit 1