docs: add APPI data processing assessment template

2026-07-18 00:21:36 +07:00
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 # APPI Data Processing and Cross-Border Assessment
 ## Status and use
 This is a customer-specific assessment template for CASAN deployments in Japan.
 It records facts needed for an APPI review; it does **not** claim that CASAN or
 a customer deployment is APPI-compliant. The customer’s privacy/legal owner
 must approve the completed version before production processing begins.
 ## Processing inventory
 | Data category | Typical source | CASAN purpose | Storage / recipient | Default retention | Deployment decision required |
 |---|---|---|---|---|---|
 | Source code and diffs | Git repository, AI coding tool | policy/test/security evaluation; Evidence Pack | customer workspace and Evidence Pack store | customer policy | whether any code may leave customer network |
 | Prompts and chat content | Control Panel / AI tool | governed response, routing, audit | customer runtime; selected model provider only when configured | customer policy | provider, country/region, model and allowed fields |
 | Secrets / credentials | source, logs, environment | detection/blocking only | should be masked; must not be placed in Evidence Pack | not retained intentionally | scanner/exception procedure |
 | Developer identifiers | IdP claims, audit record | RBAC, accountability, approval trace | customer identity/audit store | customer policy | legitimate purpose, access roles |
 | Telemetry and costs | model/provider and runner | FinOps, reliability, anomaly detection | customer telemetry store / selected provider | customer policy | provider API and export destination |
 | Evidence Pack metadata | CASAN gates and manifests | auditability and proof | customer Evidence Pack storage; optional Gitea artifact | customer policy | retention, immutable-storage setting, artifact access |
 ## Required deployment register
 For every customer project, complete the following fields and attach it to the
 PoC or production change record.
 | Field | Value / approval |
 |---|---|
 | Customer data controller / privacy contact | |
 | CASAN operator and support contact | |
 | Processing purpose and affected projects | |
 | Personal information expected in source, prompts or logs | |
 | Model providers, model IDs, processing country/region | |
 | Subprocessors and service locations | |
 | Cross-border transfer assessment / required information | |
 | Retention, deletion and export schedule | |
 | Evidence Pack, backup and artifact storage location | |
 | Incident notification contacts and target timing | |
 | Approved masking / secret-scanning policy | |
 | Approval date, reviewer and next review date | |
 ## CASAN control mapping
 - H4 / data-exfil guard scans prompts and artifacts before release. A BLOCK is
  evidence of detection, not evidence that no sensitive data was ever sent.
 - H5 audit records accountable actions and policy changes.
 - H6 records execution/cost telemetry. It must be included in the retention
  decision because it can identify a user, project, provider or run.
 - Evidence Pack stores summaries and hashes; it still needs a retention,
  access-control, backup and deletion decision.
 - Cloud-model use is opt-in at deployment time. The customer must document what
  fields are transmitted and select an allowed provider/region.
 ## Data-subject and operational procedures
 The operator must implement customer-approved procedures for access requests,
 correction/deletion/export where applicable, retention expiry, secret leak
 investigation, incident triage and vendor/subprocessor changes. A Gitea Actions
 artifact is not an immutable long-term retention system by itself.
 ## Evidence required before a production claim
 1. Completed register for each tenant/project and model route.
 2. Network/data-flow diagram tested against the deployed configuration.
 3. Provider and subprocessor review, including cross-border transfer facts.
 4. Retention/deletion test for logs, Evidence Packs, backups and CI artifacts.
 5. Incident-response tabletop or drill with named contacts.
 6. Review by the customer’s Japanese privacy/legal owner.
 ## Reference
 Use the authoritative Japanese APPI text and Personal Information Protection
 Commission guidance for the final legal assessment. English translations and
 this template are working aids only; they are not the controlling legal text.
@@ -14,3 +14,7 @@
 製品名（提案）: **CASAN AI-SDLC Governance Platform**
 （生成AIによるソフトウェア開発を、セキュリティ・品質・コスト・監査証跡の観点から統制するプラットフォーム）
 本番移行時には、顧客ごとの個人情報・越境移転・保持期間を
 [`APPI_DATA_PROCESSING.md`](../compliance/APPI_DATA_PROCESSING.md) で記録し、
 法務/プライバシー責任者の承認を得ます。
@@ -66,6 +66,12 @@
 | **17 Loop Engineering** | � T1–T6 done+test (offline) | **Agentic Loop Governance** — đủ 5 primitive + orchestrator (97/0 WSL, nối CI). T1 **Governor** (`loop-governor.py`; deny-by-default, no/corrupt policy→strict/HALT, on_exceed halt/escalate) 15/0; T2 **Convergence** (`loop-convergence.py`; repeat/thrash→OSCILLATING, flat→STALLED, fail-closed) 15/0; T3 **Verify Contract** (`loop-gate.py`; H4→DENY, unmet→FAIL, correction bounded→ESCALATE, no self-declared DONE) 20/0; T4 **Trace/Replay** (`loop-trace.py`; append-only hash-linked, edited→BREAK, tampered artifact→replay DRIFT) 16/0; T5 **Meta-loop** (`loop-metaloop.py`; propose≠apply, SoD, loosen>org_ceiling refused, apply qua governed CP store→đổi thật ceiling + rollback) 15/0; T6 **Orchestrator** (`loop-run.sh`; gate→governor→convergence→trace/turn, secure-by-default opt-out, nén giữa vòng) 16/0. State qua `CASAN_LOOP_STATE_ROOT` (repo `.specify/state` sạch). **Còn (infra):** T4 KMS-anchor head (A7 Vault), T6 widget Command Center (17.22, C5), live H3-judge. Chi tiết: `CASAN_PLAN_17_LOOP_ENGINEERING.md`. |
 | **16 Security audit remediation** | � P0/P1/P2 phần lớn done+test | **Remediation đã thực thi:** 28 SEC suite (151/0 WSL, nối `ci-harness-gate.sh`). Done: SEC-01..10, 12, 13, **14** (model-digest bỏ env-override ở prod/strict), 15, 16..21, **22** (trusted-time JWT `exp` ARCH-06 + tag proposal nguồn-không-tin ARCH-08), **26** (stored/second-order injection scan), 27..30, **23 Phase 1–5 offline** (multi-tenant: tenant-store+guard · per-tenant CP/audit/telemetry · RBAC data-boundary · tenant kill-switch/quota · ký registry · crypt at-rest per-tenant), **24 offline** (image digest-pin + ký workflow), **25 offline** (artifact attestation tested==deployed); **SEC-11 gộp vào SEC-17** (`CASAN_PROFILE=prod` enforce-by-default). **Còn 📋 planned (hạ tầng/process):** SEC-22 ARCH-10 (attestation ngoài) · SEC-23 23.11 (crypt qua Vault Transit) · **SEC-24 còn** (live CVE/OSV + scan image thật — offline image-pin/ký-workflow đã done) · **SEC-25 còn** (signed-commit enrollment + SLSA chain — offline artifact-attestation đã done). Chi tiết: `CASAN_PLAN_16` §0a/§2d. |
 | **18 Chat Console** | ✅ **MVP-0 + MVP-1 + MVP-2 + MVP-3 + Track M done+test** | **Governed Chat Console** (cắt lát MVP chống lan man). **MVP-0 Ask CASAN read-only DONE**: `prompt-mode-router.py`, `chat-readonly.py`, `chat-session.schema.json`, H4 input/output scan, H5 chat audit hash-chain, H6 token telemetry, answer kèm evidence sources. **MVP-1 Operator DONE**: registered actions through `action-gate`, no free-command, action artifacts with provenance. **MVP-2 Track 4 DONE**: `agent-registry.yaml`, `chat-agent-resolver.py`, `chat:select_agent` RBAC, delegation hold, tool allowlist BLOCK, Control Panel agent picker, CODEGEN draft-only through `artifact-scan` + Plan-17 loop certification. **MVP-2 OPERATOR Track 5/6 DONE**: `chat-turn.py` certifies UNCERTIFIED draft through Plan-17 `loop-run.sh` + trace verify/replay before side-effect release. **Track 8.1/8.2 DONE**: `chat-replay.py` verifies chat chain, evidence artifact hash, and OPERATOR/CODEGEN loop replay; Control Panel `GET /api/v1/chat/replay`. **Track 8.3 DONE**: Command Center `chat_loop` widget reads chat audit/replay evidence, loop ticker, budget gauge, and click-through evidence drawer. **Track 8.4 DONE**: `REQUIRES_APPROVAL` chat turns become pending `chat.escalate` approvals, SoD/reason enforced, strict/fake JWT denied before mutation. **Track 9 DONE**: non-default tenant chat state is partitioned by `tenant-store.sh`, explicit cross-tenant replay paths are denied, encrypted audit snapshots are written via `tenant-crypt.sh`, tenant kill-switch/quota are isolated. Test: chat suites **59/0** (`phase-chat-prompt-router` 9/0, `phase-chat-readonly` 5/0, `phase-chat-session-audit` 3/0, `phase-chat-operator` 8/0, `phase-chat-agent-select` 8/0, `phase-chat-pipeline` 4/0, `phase-chat-stream-hold` 2/0, `phase-chat-replay` 4/0, `phase-chat-approval` 4/0, `phase-chat-codegen` 4/0, `phase-chat-tenant` 8/0), Control Panel **29/0** + build xanh. **Track M (2026-07-09) DONE**: model-optional grounded synthesis — read-only Ask CASAN tổng hợp câu trả lời tự nhiên có citations qua `model-router.sh` khi `CASAN_CHAT_MODEL_MODE=model` (config `model-providers.yaml`), offline-first (mặc định deterministic), fail-safe fallback, cloud→ép preflight PII-guard, model output vẫn qua H4 (secret→DENY), H6 real token/cost. `phase-chat-model-synthesis` **7/0** (chat suites **66/0**), nối `ci-harness-gate.sh`, UI badge model/deterministic. **Uplift items 1–5 (2026-07-09b) DONE**: (1) ANALYSIS mode reasoning/compare; (2) multi-turn memory per-chat/tenant nén Plan-08; (3) streaming draft UNCERTIFIED→final (API `/chat/ask/stream` + UI toggle); (4) CODEGEN full model-router draft (artifact-scan + loop-cert); (5) `chat-cloud-smoke.sh` (SKIP nếu thiếu key). `phase-chat-advanced` **8/0**, chat suites **74/0**. Còn: cloud live-smoke với key thật; token-level SSE (hiện 2-pha). |
 ## Production-enterprise preparation (P2)
 | Hạng mục | Trạng thái | Bước tiếp theo |
 |---|:--:|---|
 | APPI/data-processing documentation | 🟡 template ready | `docs/compliance/APPI_DATA_PROCESSING.md` records the customer/project/model data register, retention, transfer and incident-review evidence. Complete and approve it with the Japanese privacy/legal owner for each production tenant. |
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 ## Trần điểm & điều kiện lên "Strong (81+)"