feat(plan-01): Phase 1 — relocate harness code to packages/casan-harness (symlink facade)

Physically move the pure-code subtrees out of .specify into the package, leaving
compat symlinks at the old .specify/<dir> paths so every existing reference (internal
CASAN_HARNESS_ROOT + external CI/docker/mjs) keeps resolving. Runtime state stays put.

Moved (git mv): scripts/ tests/ security/ templates/ config/ governance/ memory/
  .specify/<dir>  ->  packages/casan-harness/<dir>   (+ .specify/<dir> symlink)
Stays in .specify (state/governance/domain, handled later): logs/ agentops/ level5/
  init-options.json traceability-map.json

Python `.resolve()` self-location followed the compat symlink into packages and lost
the app root; generate-casan-demo-context.py, generate-agentops-dashboard.py and
dashboard-server.py now walk UP for the `.specify` state marker instead of a fixed
parent depth (fixes "missing trace files" in run-casan4).

Full gate: PASS=64 FAIL=0 SKIP=3 (CASAN_CI_STEP_TIMEOUT_SEC=1200 — track-a ~450s runs
close to the 600s default and can tip over under load; this is timing variance, not a
regression — it passed cleanly with headroom). Runtime log/audit artifacts kept unstaged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

AINative_OKR_CASAN5/packages/casan-harness/tests/phase-sec30-tests.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -uo pipefail
+
+# CASAN Plan-16 SEC-30 (X-06) — approval replay prevention (one-time-use nonce).
+#
+# A verified approval (offline signature or IdP JWT) is valid for its whole exp
+# window, so it could be replayed to approve repeatedly. approval-verify now records
+# a per-token nonce and rejects any repeat (in enforced mode / when a nonce ledger
+# is configured). Proves first use is accepted, replay is denied, and dev mode
+# (no ledger) is unchanged.
+#
+# Self-contained: ephemeral reviewer key + committed registry.
+
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+source "$SCRIPT_DIR/../scripts/bash/casan-paths.sh"
+PROJECT_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/../.." && pwd)"
+S="$CASAN_HARNESS_ROOT/scripts/bash"
+REG="$CASAN_GOVERNANCE_ROOT/reviewers.registry"
+WORK="$(mktemp -d)"; RV="$WORK/reviewers"; mkdir -p "$RV"
+trap 'rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT
+
+openssl genrsa -out "$WORK/sl.priv" 2048 2>/dev/null
+openssl rsa -in "$WORK/sl.priv" -pubout -out "$RV/security-lead.pub.pem" 2>/dev/null
+printf 'security.strict' > "$WORK/inp"
+bash "$S/approval-sign.sh" policy_change alice "$WORK/inp" security-lead "$WORK/sl.priv" "$WORK/a.sig" >/dev/null 2>&1
+
+export CASAN_REVIEWERS_FILE="$REG" CASAN_REVIEWERS_DIR="$RV"
+
+PASS=0; FAIL=0
+pass() { echo "PASS: $1"; PASS=$((PASS + 1)); }
+fail() { echo "FAIL: $1"; FAIL=$((FAIL + 1)); }
+rc_of() { set +e; "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1; echo $?; set -e 2>/dev/null || true; }
+
+echo "===== Plan-16 SEC-30: approval replay prevention ====="
+
+# With a nonce ledger configured, the first use is accepted, a replay is denied.
+[[ "$(rc_of env CASAN_APPROVAL_NONCE_FILE="$WORK/nonces.txt" bash "$S/approval-verify.sh" policy_change alice "$WORK/inp" security-lead "$WORK/a.sig")" -eq 0 ]] \
+  && pass "first use of a valid approval accepted" || fail "first use rejected"
+
+[[ "$(rc_of env CASAN_APPROVAL_NONCE_FILE="$WORK/nonces.txt" bash "$S/approval-verify.sh" policy_change alice "$WORK/inp" security-lead "$WORK/a.sig")" -ne 0 ]] \
+  && pass "replay of the same approval DENIED (one-time-use)" || fail "replay accepted"
+
+# Dev default (no ledger, no prod profile): no replay tracking (backward compatible).
+R1="$(rc_of bash "$S/approval-verify.sh" policy_change alice "$WORK/inp" security-lead "$WORK/a.sig")"
+R2="$(rc_of bash "$S/approval-verify.sh" policy_change alice "$WORK/inp" security-lead "$WORK/a.sig")"
+[[ "$R1" -eq 0 && "$R2" -eq 0 ]] \
+  && pass "dev mode: no nonce ledger → replay allowed (backward compatible)" \
+  || fail "dev mode changed (r1=$R1 r2=$R2)"
+
+echo ""
+echo "===== SEC-30 SUMMARY: PASS=$PASS FAIL=$FAIL ====="
+[[ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ]] || exit 1