feat(plan-01): Phase 1 — relocate harness code to packages/casan-harness (symlink facade)

Physically move the pure-code subtrees out of .specify into the package, leaving
compat symlinks at the old .specify/<dir> paths so every existing reference (internal
CASAN_HARNESS_ROOT + external CI/docker/mjs) keeps resolving. Runtime state stays put.

Moved (git mv): scripts/ tests/ security/ templates/ config/ governance/ memory/
  .specify/<dir>  ->  packages/casan-harness/<dir>   (+ .specify/<dir> symlink)
Stays in .specify (state/governance/domain, handled later): logs/ agentops/ level5/
  init-options.json traceability-map.json

Python `.resolve()` self-location followed the compat symlink into packages and lost
the app root; generate-casan-demo-context.py, generate-agentops-dashboard.py and
dashboard-server.py now walk UP for the `.specify` state marker instead of a fixed
parent depth (fixes "missing trace files" in run-casan4).

Full gate: PASS=64 FAIL=0 SKIP=3 (CASAN_CI_STEP_TIMEOUT_SEC=1200 — track-a ~450s runs
close to the 600s default and can tip over under load; this is timing variance, not a
regression — it passed cleanly with headroom). Runtime log/audit artifacts kept unstaged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

AINative_OKR_CASAN5/packages/casan-harness/tests/phase-sec28-tests.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -uo pipefail
+
+# CASAN Plan-16 SEC-28 (X-04) — path-traversal / symlink guard.
+#
+# path-guard.sh resolves the REAL path (following symlinks, normalizing "..") and
+# refuses anything that escapes the allowed root — so a tool file argument cannot be
+# a symlink to /etc/passwd or a ../.. escape. Proves in-root paths pass and escapes
+# (via .. and via symlink) are rejected.
+#
+# Deterministic; hermetic.
+
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+source "$SCRIPT_DIR/../scripts/bash/casan-paths.sh"
+PROJECT_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/../.." && pwd)"
+PG="$CASAN_HARNESS_ROOT/scripts/bash/path-guard.sh"
+WORK="$(mktemp -d)"
+trap 'rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT
+
+PASS=0; FAIL=0
+pass() { echo "PASS: $1"; PASS=$((PASS + 1)); }
+fail() { echo "FAIL: $1"; FAIL=$((FAIL + 1)); }
+rc_of() { set +e; "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1; echo $?; set -e 2>/dev/null || true; }
+
+echo "===== Plan-16 SEC-28: path-traversal / symlink guard ====="
+
+mkdir -p "$WORK/root/sub"
+[[ "$(rc_of bash "$PG" "$WORK/root/sub/out.txt" "$WORK/root")" -eq 0 ]] \
+  && pass "in-root path accepted" || fail "in-root path rejected"
+
+[[ "$(rc_of bash "$PG" "$WORK/root/../../etc/passwd" "$WORK/root")" -ne 0 ]] \
+  && pass "'..' escape rejected" || fail "'..' escape accepted"
+
+# A symlink inside the root that points OUTSIDE it must be rejected.
+ln -s /etc/passwd "$WORK/root/evil-link"
+[[ "$(rc_of bash "$PG" "$WORK/root/evil-link" "$WORK/root")" -ne 0 ]] \
+  && pass "symlink escaping root rejected (realpath resolves the target)" \
+  || fail "symlink escape accepted"
+
+# A symlink that stays inside the root is fine.
+echo hi > "$WORK/root/sub/real.txt"
+ln -s "$WORK/root/sub/real.txt" "$WORK/root/ok-link"
+[[ "$(rc_of bash "$PG" "$WORK/root/ok-link" "$WORK/root")" -eq 0 ]] \
+  && pass "in-root symlink accepted" || fail "in-root symlink rejected"
+
+echo ""
+echo "===== SEC-28 SUMMARY: PASS=$PASS FAIL=$FAIL ====="
+[[ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ]] || exit 1