feat(plan-01): Phase 1 — relocate harness code to packages/casan-harness (symlink facade)
Physically move the pure-code subtrees out of .specify into the package, leaving compat symlinks at the old .specify/<dir> paths so every existing reference (internal CASAN_HARNESS_ROOT + external CI/docker/mjs) keeps resolving. Runtime state stays put. Moved (git mv): scripts/ tests/ security/ templates/ config/ governance/ memory/ .specify/<dir> -> packages/casan-harness/<dir> (+ .specify/<dir> symlink) Stays in .specify (state/governance/domain, handled later): logs/ agentops/ level5/ init-options.json traceability-map.json Python `.resolve()` self-location followed the compat symlink into packages and lost the app root; generate-casan-demo-context.py, generate-agentops-dashboard.py and dashboard-server.py now walk UP for the `.specify` state marker instead of a fixed parent depth (fixes "missing trace files" in run-casan4). Full gate: PASS=64 FAIL=0 SKIP=3 (CASAN_CI_STEP_TIMEOUT_SEC=1200 — track-a ~450s runs close to the 600s default and can tip over under load; this is timing variance, not a regression — it passed cleanly with headroom). Runtime log/audit artifacts kept unstaged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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co-authored by
Claude Opus 4.8
parent
2c765c9a45
commit
664bd1f00c
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
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set -uo pipefail
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# CASAN Plan-16 SEC-23 Phase 4+5-offline (MT-04 / MT-02):
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# * 23.9 signed tenant/project registry — a valid signature verifies; a tampered,
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# forged (wrong key), or UNSIGNED registry is REFUSED (fail-closed),
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# * 23.10 per-tenant encryption at rest — tenant A's state is ciphertext on disk;
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# A can decrypt its own; tenant B (different key) CANNOT read A's plaintext.
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#
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# Deterministic; hermetic; uses real openssl (skip-aware if absent).
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SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
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source "$SCRIPT_DIR/../scripts/bash/casan-paths.sh"
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PROJECT_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/../.." && pwd)"
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S="$CASAN_HARNESS_ROOT/scripts/bash"
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RV="$S/tenant-registry-verify.sh"
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TC="$S/tenant-crypt.sh"
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WORK="$(mktemp -d)"
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trap 'rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT
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export CASAN_TENANT_STATE_ROOT="$WORK/tenants"
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PASS=0; FAIL=0
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pass() { echo "PASS: $1"; PASS=$((PASS + 1)); }
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fail() { echo "FAIL: $1"; FAIL=$((FAIL + 1)); }
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rc_of() { set +e; "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1; echo $?; set -e 2>/dev/null || true; }
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command -v openssl >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo "SKIP: openssl unavailable"; exit 0; }
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echo "===== Plan-16 SEC-23 Phase 4+5-offline: signed registry + per-tenant crypt ====="
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# keys
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openssl genrsa -out "$WORK/reg.priv.pem" 2048 2>/dev/null
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openssl rsa -in "$WORK/reg.priv.pem" -pubout -out "$WORK/reg.pub.pem" 2>/dev/null
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openssl genrsa -out "$WORK/attacker.priv.pem" 2048 2>/dev/null
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# --- 23.9 registry sign/verify ---
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printf '{"tenants":["alpha","beta"]}\n' > "$WORK/reg1.json"
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bash "$RV" sign "$WORK/reg1.json" "$WORK/reg.priv.pem" >/dev/null 2>&1
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[[ "$(rc_of bash "$RV" verify "$WORK/reg1.json" "$WORK/reg.pub.pem")" -eq 0 ]] \
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&& pass "23.9 valid signed registry verifies" || fail "23.9 valid registry rejected"
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cp "$WORK/reg1.json" "$WORK/reg2.json"; bash "$RV" sign "$WORK/reg2.json" "$WORK/reg.priv.pem" >/dev/null 2>&1
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printf '{"tenants":["alpha","beta","evil"]}\n' > "$WORK/reg2.json" # tamper after signing
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[[ "$(rc_of bash "$RV" verify "$WORK/reg2.json" "$WORK/reg.pub.pem")" -eq 2 ]] \
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&& pass "23.9 tampered registry is REFUSED" || fail "23.9 tampered registry accepted"
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cp "$WORK/reg1.json" "$WORK/reg3.json"; bash "$RV" sign "$WORK/reg3.json" "$WORK/attacker.priv.pem" >/dev/null 2>&1
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[[ "$(rc_of bash "$RV" verify "$WORK/reg3.json" "$WORK/reg.pub.pem")" -eq 2 ]] \
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&& pass "23.9 forged (wrong-key) registry is REFUSED" || fail "23.9 forged registry accepted"
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cp "$WORK/reg1.json" "$WORK/reg4.json" # no .sig produced
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[[ "$(rc_of bash "$RV" verify "$WORK/reg4.json" "$WORK/reg.pub.pem")" -eq 3 ]] \
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&& pass "23.9 UNSIGNED registry fails CLOSED (refused)" || fail "23.9 unsigned registry not refused"
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# --- 23.10 per-tenant encryption at rest ---
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SECRET="SECRET-A-audit-line-12345"
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printf '%s\n' "$SECRET" > "$WORK/pa.txt"
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CASAN_TENANT_ID=alpha bash "$TC" encrypt "$WORK/pa.txt" "$WORK/ca.enc" >/dev/null 2>&1
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grep -q "$SECRET" "$WORK/ca.enc" 2>/dev/null \
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&& fail "23.10 plaintext leaked into ciphertext" \
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|| pass "23.10 tenant A state is ciphertext on disk (no plaintext)"
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CASAN_TENANT_ID=alpha bash "$TC" decrypt "$WORK/ca.enc" "$WORK/da.txt" >/dev/null 2>&1
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grep -q "$SECRET" "$WORK/da.txt" 2>/dev/null \
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&& pass "23.10 tenant A decrypts its own state (roundtrip)" || fail "23.10 tenant A roundtrip failed"
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CASAN_TENANT_ID=beta bash "$TC" decrypt "$WORK/ca.enc" "$WORK/db.txt" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
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grep -q "$SECRET" "$WORK/db.txt" 2>/dev/null \
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&& fail "23.10 tenant B read tenant A's plaintext (isolation broken)" \
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|| pass "23.10 tenant B CANNOT read tenant A's plaintext (per-tenant key)"
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echo ""
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echo "===== SEC-23 Phase 4+5-offline SUMMARY: PASS=$PASS FAIL=$FAIL ====="
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[[ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ]] || exit 1
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