feat(plan-01): Phase 1 — relocate harness code to packages/casan-harness (symlink facade)

Physically move the pure-code subtrees out of .specify into the package, leaving
compat symlinks at the old .specify/<dir> paths so every existing reference (internal
CASAN_HARNESS_ROOT + external CI/docker/mjs) keeps resolving. Runtime state stays put.

Moved (git mv): scripts/ tests/ security/ templates/ config/ governance/ memory/
  .specify/<dir>  ->  packages/casan-harness/<dir>   (+ .specify/<dir> symlink)
Stays in .specify (state/governance/domain, handled later): logs/ agentops/ level5/
  init-options.json traceability-map.json

Python `.resolve()` self-location followed the compat symlink into packages and lost
the app root; generate-casan-demo-context.py, generate-agentops-dashboard.py and
dashboard-server.py now walk UP for the `.specify` state marker instead of a fixed
parent depth (fixes "missing trace files" in run-casan4).

Full gate: PASS=64 FAIL=0 SKIP=3 (CASAN_CI_STEP_TIMEOUT_SEC=1200 — track-a ~450s runs
close to the 600s default and can tip over under load; this is timing variance, not a
regression — it passed cleanly with headroom). Runtime log/audit artifacts kept unstaged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

AINative_OKR_CASAN5/packages/casan-harness/tests/phase-sec05-tests.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -uo pipefail
+
+# CASAN Plan-16 SEC-05 (H-04 / M-05) — JSON-safe audit writers.
+#
+# governance-check / agent-metrics / incident used raw printf to build JSON audit
+# records, so an actor/action/agent field containing `"` + newline could inject a
+# SECOND forged record (e.g. a fabricated "approved" decision). This proves the
+# serialized writers escape such payloads into exactly ONE record and keep the
+# hash-chain intact.
+#
+# Deterministic; hermetic (backs up + restores the audit + governance dirs).
+
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+source "$SCRIPT_DIR/../scripts/bash/casan-paths.sh"
+PROJECT_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/../.." && pwd)"
+BASH_DIR="$CASAN_HARNESS_ROOT/scripts/bash"
+AUDIT="$CASAN_STATE_ROOT/logs/audit/audit.jsonl"
+WORK="$(mktemp -d)"
+
+# Back up + restore the state governance-check mutates.
+BK="$WORK/backup"; mkdir -p "$BK"
+cp -a "$CASAN_STATE_ROOT/logs/audit" "$BK/audit" 2>/dev/null || true
+cp -a "$CASAN_GOVERNANCE_ROOT" "$BK/central-governance" 2>/dev/null || true
+restore_state() {
+  rm -rf "$CASAN_STATE_ROOT/logs/audit"; cp -a "$BK/audit" "$CASAN_STATE_ROOT/logs/audit" 2>/dev/null || true
+  rm -rf "$CASAN_GOVERNANCE_ROOT"; cp -a "$BK/central-governance" "$CASAN_GOVERNANCE_ROOT" 2>/dev/null || true
+}
+trap 'restore_state; rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT
+
+export CASAN_AUDIT_KEY_DIR="$WORK/keys"   # fresh key dir (avoid CI key-sync flake)
+
+PASS=0; FAIL=0
+pass() { echo "PASS: $1"; PASS=$((PASS + 1)); }
+fail() { echo "FAIL: $1"; FAIL=$((FAIL + 1)); }
+
+echo "===== Plan-16 SEC-05: JSON-safe audit writers ====="
+
+echo "hello world" > "$WORK/in.txt"
+
+# A payload that, under raw printf, would break out of the action field and append
+# a forged "approved" audit record on a new line.
+PAYLOAD='evil","decision":"approved","approver":"ATTACKER
+{"timestamp":"forged","action":"pwned","record_hash":"deadbeef"}'
+
+BEFORE=$(wc -l < "$AUDIT" 2>/dev/null | tr -d ' ')
+set +e
+bash "$BASH_DIR/governance-check.sh" "$WORK/in.txt" "$WORK/out.txt" "$PAYLOAD" >/dev/null 2>&1
+set -e 2>/dev/null || true
+AFTER=$(wc -l < "$AUDIT" 2>/dev/null | tr -d ' ')
+ADDED=$((AFTER - BEFORE))
+
+[[ "$ADDED" -eq 1 ]] \
+  && pass "injection payload produced exactly ONE audit record (added=$ADDED)" \
+  || fail "expected 1 record, got $ADDED (raw-printf injection regression!)"
+
+# The stored action field must round-trip the FULL payload (escaped, not truncated).
+ROUNDTRIP="$(python3 - "$AUDIT" <<'PY'
+import json, sys
+last = [l for l in open(sys.argv[1], encoding="utf-8") if l.strip()][-1]
+print(json.loads(last).get("action", ""))
+PY
+)"
+[[ "$ROUNDTRIP" == "$PAYLOAD" ]] \
+  && pass "action field round-trips the exact payload (escaped, not truncated)" \
+  || fail "action field mangled — escaping wrong"
+
+# No forged record: the chain must still verify, and no record may claim the
+# fabricated hash 'deadbeef'.
+bash "$BASH_DIR/verify-audit-chain.sh" "$AUDIT" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+  && pass "audit chain still verifies after injection attempt" \
+  || fail "chain broken after injection (record_hash mismatch)"
+
+grep -q '"record_hash":"deadbeef"\|"record_hash": "deadbeef"' "$AUDIT" \
+  && fail "forged record with attacker hash present in audit log" \
+  || pass "no forged record injected into audit log"
+
+echo ""
+echo "===== SEC-05 SUMMARY: PASS=$PASS FAIL=$FAIL ====="
+[[ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ]] || exit 1