feat(plan-01): Phase 1 — relocate harness code to packages/casan-harness (symlink facade)
Physically move the pure-code subtrees out of .specify into the package, leaving compat symlinks at the old .specify/<dir> paths so every existing reference (internal CASAN_HARNESS_ROOT + external CI/docker/mjs) keeps resolving. Runtime state stays put. Moved (git mv): scripts/ tests/ security/ templates/ config/ governance/ memory/ .specify/<dir> -> packages/casan-harness/<dir> (+ .specify/<dir> symlink) Stays in .specify (state/governance/domain, handled later): logs/ agentops/ level5/ init-options.json traceability-map.json Python `.resolve()` self-location followed the compat symlink into packages and lost the app root; generate-casan-demo-context.py, generate-agentops-dashboard.py and dashboard-server.py now walk UP for the `.specify` state marker instead of a fixed parent depth (fixes "missing trace files" in run-casan4). Full gate: PASS=64 FAIL=0 SKIP=3 (CASAN_CI_STEP_TIMEOUT_SEC=1200 — track-a ~450s runs close to the 600s default and can tip over under load; this is timing variance, not a regression — it passed cleanly with headroom). Runtime log/audit artifacts kept unstaged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
thanhnv
co-authored by
Claude Opus 4.8
Claude Opus 4.8
parent
2c765c9a45
commit
664bd1f00c
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
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set -uo pipefail
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# CASAN Plan-16 SEC-01 (H-01) — "unsigned = FAIL" in enforced mode.
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#
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# Proves that verify-audit-chain / verify-tool-audit / telemetry-integrity /
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# evidence-pack all treat a missing (or unverifiable) signature as a FAILURE when
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# strict enforcement is on, while keeping the permissive dev default unchanged.
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# Enforcement is triggered by either CASAN_VERIFY_STRICT=1 or CASAN_PROFILE=prod.
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#
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# Deterministic; no model/app/network. Hermetic: builds throwaway logs in a temp
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# workspace; the telemetry case backs up + restores the real head artifacts.
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SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
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source "$SCRIPT_DIR/../scripts/bash/casan-paths.sh"
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PROJECT_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/../.." && pwd)"
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BASH_DIR="$CASAN_HARNESS_ROOT/scripts/bash"
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WORK="$(mktemp -d)"
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# Back up telemetry head artifacts (fixed-path; the sign step mutates them).
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L5_DIR="$CASAN_STATE_ROOT/logs/level5"
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TEL_BAK="$WORK/tel-bak"; mkdir -p "$TEL_BAK"
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for f in telemetry-manifest.json telemetry-head.txt telemetry-head.sig; do
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[[ -f "$L5_DIR/$f" ]] && cp -p "$L5_DIR/$f" "$TEL_BAK/$f"
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done
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restore_tel() {
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for f in telemetry-manifest.json telemetry-head.txt telemetry-head.sig; do
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if [[ -f "$TEL_BAK/$f" ]]; then cp -p "$TEL_BAK/$f" "$L5_DIR/$f"; else rm -f "$L5_DIR/$f"; fi
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done
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}
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trap 'restore_tel; rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT
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PASS=0; FAIL=0
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pass() { echo "PASS: $1"; PASS=$((PASS + 1)); }
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fail() { echo "FAIL: $1"; FAIL=$((FAIL + 1)); }
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# rc_of <env-assignments-or-empty> <cmd...> : run, print exit code, never abort.
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rc_of() { set +e; "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1; echo $?; set -e 2>/dev/null || true; }
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echo "===== Plan-16 SEC-01: unsigned = FAIL in enforced mode ====="
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# 1) verify-audit-chain.sh — build a genuine unsigned chain (no head/sig files)
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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AUD_DIR="$WORK/audit"; mkdir -p "$AUD_DIR"
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python3 - "$AUD_DIR/audit.jsonl" <<'PY'
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import hashlib, json, sys
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path = sys.argv[1]
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prev = ""
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core = "|".join(["2026-07-06T00:00:00Z", "t1", "act", "a@x", "low", "ALLOW", "n/a", "", "ih", "oh", prev])
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h = hashlib.sha256(core.encode()).hexdigest()
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rec = {"timestamp":"2026-07-06T00:00:00Z","trace_id":"t1","action":"act","actor":"a@x",
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"risk_level":"low","decision":"ALLOW","approval_status":"n/a","approver":"",
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"input_hash":"ih","output_hash":"oh","previous_record_hash":prev,"record_hash":h}
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open(path,"w").write(json.dumps(rec)+"\n")
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PY
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RC="$(rc_of bash "$BASH_DIR/verify-audit-chain.sh" "$AUD_DIR/audit.jsonl")"
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[[ "$RC" -eq 0 ]] && pass "audit-chain: unsigned OK in permissive mode (rc=0)" \
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|| fail "audit-chain: permissive mode should pass unsigned (rc=$RC)"
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RC="$(rc_of env CASAN_VERIFY_STRICT=1 bash "$BASH_DIR/verify-audit-chain.sh" "$AUD_DIR/audit.jsonl")"
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[[ "$RC" -ne 0 ]] && pass "audit-chain: unsigned FAILS with CASAN_VERIFY_STRICT=1 (rc=$RC)" \
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|| fail "audit-chain: strict flag did not fail unsigned (rc=$RC)"
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RC="$(rc_of env CASAN_PROFILE=prod bash "$BASH_DIR/verify-audit-chain.sh" "$AUD_DIR/audit.jsonl")"
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[[ "$RC" -ne 0 ]] && pass "audit-chain: unsigned FAILS with CASAN_PROFILE=prod (rc=$RC)" \
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|| fail "audit-chain: prod profile did not fail unsigned (rc=$RC)"
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# Attack: tamper a field, recompute record_hash so the chain is internally valid,
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# leave no signature. Strict must STILL fail (recompute does not save the forger).
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python3 - "$AUD_DIR/audit.jsonl" <<'PY'
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import hashlib, json, sys
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path = sys.argv[1]
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rec = json.loads(open(path).read().strip())
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rec["decision"] = "DENY_BYPASSED" # forge the verdict
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prev = ""
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core = "|".join([rec["timestamp"],rec["trace_id"],rec["action"],rec["actor"],rec["risk_level"],
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rec["decision"],rec["approval_status"],rec["approver"],rec["input_hash"],
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rec["output_hash"],prev])
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rec["record_hash"] = hashlib.sha256(core.encode()).hexdigest() # recompute → chain valid
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open(path,"w").write(json.dumps(rec)+"\n")
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PY
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RC="$(rc_of env CASAN_VERIFY_STRICT=1 bash "$BASH_DIR/verify-audit-chain.sh" "$AUD_DIR/audit.jsonl")"
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[[ "$RC" -ne 0 ]] && pass "audit-chain: tamper+recompute+no-sig still FAILS in strict (rc=$RC)" \
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|| fail "audit-chain: recomputed forged chain passed strict (rc=$RC)"
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# 2) verify-tool-audit.sh — genuine unsigned tool-calls chain
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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TOOL_DIR="$WORK/tool"; mkdir -p "$TOOL_DIR"
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python3 - "$TOOL_DIR/tool-calls.jsonl" <<'PY'
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import hashlib, json, sys
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path = sys.argv[1]
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prev = ""
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rec = {"timestamp":"2026-07-06T00:00:00Z","tool":"bash","actor":"a@x","previous_record_hash":prev}
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core = json.dumps(rec, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
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rec["record_hash"] = hashlib.sha256((prev + "|" + core).encode()).hexdigest()
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open(path,"w").write(json.dumps(rec)+"\n")
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PY
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RC="$(rc_of bash "$BASH_DIR/verify-tool-audit.sh" "$TOOL_DIR/tool-calls.jsonl")"
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[[ "$RC" -eq 0 ]] && pass "tool-audit: unsigned OK in permissive mode (rc=0)" \
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|| fail "tool-audit: permissive mode should pass unsigned (rc=$RC)"
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RC="$(rc_of env CASAN_VERIFY_STRICT=1 bash "$BASH_DIR/verify-tool-audit.sh" "$TOOL_DIR/tool-calls.jsonl")"
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[[ "$RC" -ne 0 ]] && pass "tool-audit: unsigned FAILS with CASAN_VERIFY_STRICT=1 (rc=$RC)" \
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|| fail "tool-audit: strict flag did not fail unsigned (rc=$RC)"
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# 3) telemetry-integrity.sh — sign (unsigned, no key), then strict verify fails
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Force the keyless path so the head is written WITHOUT a signature.
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env CASAN_AUDIT_PRIV="$WORK/nonexistent.pem" bash "$BASH_DIR/telemetry-integrity.sh" sign >/dev/null 2>&1
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RC="$(rc_of env CASAN_AUDIT_PUB="$WORK/nonexistent.pem" bash "$BASH_DIR/telemetry-integrity.sh" verify)"
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[[ "$RC" -eq 0 ]] && pass "telemetry: unsigned OK in permissive mode (rc=0)" \
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|| fail "telemetry: permissive mode should pass unsigned (rc=$RC)"
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RC="$(rc_of env CASAN_VERIFY_STRICT=1 CASAN_AUDIT_PUB="$WORK/nonexistent.pem" bash "$BASH_DIR/telemetry-integrity.sh" verify)"
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[[ "$RC" -ne 0 ]] && pass "telemetry: unsigned FAILS with CASAN_VERIFY_STRICT=1 (rc=$RC)" \
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|| fail "telemetry: strict flag did not fail unsigned (rc=$RC)"
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# 4) evidence-pack.sh verify-pack — build a valid unsigned pack (no .sig)
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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PACK_DIR="$WORK/pack"; mkdir -p "$PACK_DIR"
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echo "hello evidence" > "$PACK_DIR/report.txt"
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python3 - "$PACK_DIR" <<'PY'
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import hashlib, json, os, sys
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d = sys.argv[1]
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files = {}
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for fn in os.listdir(d):
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p = os.path.join(d, fn)
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if os.path.isfile(p):
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files[fn] = hashlib.sha256(open(p,"rb").read()).hexdigest()
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canonical = json.dumps(files, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
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head = hashlib.sha256(canonical.encode()).hexdigest()
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json.dump({"files": files, "manifest_head": head}, open(os.path.join(d,"artifact-manifest.json"),"w"))
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open(os.path.join(d,"manifest-head.txt"),"w").write(head)
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PY
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RC="$(rc_of bash "$BASH_DIR/evidence-pack.sh" verify-pack testrun --dir "$PACK_DIR")"
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[[ "$RC" -eq 0 ]] && pass "evidence-pack: unsigned OK in permissive mode (rc=0)" \
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|| fail "evidence-pack: permissive mode should pass unsigned (rc=$RC)"
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RC="$(rc_of env CASAN_VERIFY_STRICT=1 bash "$BASH_DIR/evidence-pack.sh" verify-pack testrun --dir "$PACK_DIR")"
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[[ "$RC" -ne 0 ]] && pass "evidence-pack: unsigned FAILS with CASAN_VERIFY_STRICT=1 (rc=$RC)" \
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|| fail "evidence-pack: strict flag did not fail unsigned (rc=$RC)"
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echo ""
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echo "===== SEC-01 SUMMARY: PASS=$PASS FAIL=$FAIL ====="
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[[ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ]] || exit 1
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