feat(plan-01): Phase 1 — relocate harness code to packages/casan-harness (symlink facade)

Physically move the pure-code subtrees out of .specify into the package, leaving
compat symlinks at the old .specify/<dir> paths so every existing reference (internal
CASAN_HARNESS_ROOT + external CI/docker/mjs) keeps resolving. Runtime state stays put.

Moved (git mv): scripts/ tests/ security/ templates/ config/ governance/ memory/
  .specify/<dir>  ->  packages/casan-harness/<dir>   (+ .specify/<dir> symlink)
Stays in .specify (state/governance/domain, handled later): logs/ agentops/ level5/
  init-options.json traceability-map.json

Python `.resolve()` self-location followed the compat symlink into packages and lost
the app root; generate-casan-demo-context.py, generate-agentops-dashboard.py and
dashboard-server.py now walk UP for the `.specify` state marker instead of a fixed
parent depth (fixes "missing trace files" in run-casan4).

Full gate: PASS=64 FAIL=0 SKIP=3 (CASAN_CI_STEP_TIMEOUT_SEC=1200 — track-a ~450s runs
close to the 600s default and can tip over under load; this is timing variance, not a
regression — it passed cleanly with headroom). Runtime log/audit artifacts kept unstaged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

AINative_OKR_CASAN5/packages/casan-harness/scripts/bash/supply-chain-integrity.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -uo pipefail
+
+# CASAN Plan-16 SEC-24 (SC-05/06, offline) — supply-chain integrity for build files.
+#
+# Two harness-side controls that need no network:
+#   * image-pin: Dockerfiles / CI workflow files must pin container images by DIGEST
+#     (`@sha256:...`), never a floating tag (`:latest`, `:20`, or no tag) — a floating
+#     tag lets a malicious image be swapped in under the same name.
+#   * sign / verify: a CI workflow (or any build file) is signed and verified on load;
+#     a tampered, forged, or UNSIGNED file is REFUSED (fail-closed).
+#
+# (Live CVE/OSV scanning and real image scanning need infra and remain planned.)
+#
+# Usage:
+#   supply-chain-integrity.sh image-pin <file> [<file> ...]
+#   supply-chain-integrity.sh sign      <file> <priv-key>
+#   supply-chain-integrity.sh verify    <file> <pub-key>
+# Exit: 0 ok · 2 violation (unpinned image / tampered-forged sig) · 3 missing/unsigned/openssl · 64 usage.
+
+CMD="${1:-}"; shift || true
+
+case "$CMD" in
+  image-pin)
+    [[ "$#" -ge 1 ]] || { echo "usage: supply-chain-integrity.sh image-pin <file>..." >&2; exit 64; }
+    for f in "$@"; do [[ -f "$f" ]] || { echo "IMAGE_PIN_MISSING file=$f" >&2; exit 3; }; done
+    python3 - "$@" <<'PY'
+import re, sys
+bad = []
+# image refs from Dockerfile `FROM x` and workflow/compose `image: x`
+pat = re.compile(r'^\s*(?:FROM\s+|image:\s*["\']?)([^\s"\']+)', re.IGNORECASE)
+for path in sys.argv[1:]:
+    for i, line in enumerate(open(path, encoding="utf-8", errors="replace"), 1):
+        m = pat.match(line)
+        if not m:
+            continue
+        ref = m.group(1).strip()
+        low = ref.lower()
+        if low in ("scratch",):
+            continue
+        # bare single token with no registry path and no tag = local build stage -> ok
+        if "/" not in ref and ":" not in ref and "." not in ref and "@" not in ref:
+            continue
+        if "@sha256:" in ref:
+            continue  # digest-pinned -> ok
+        bad.append(f"{path}:{i} unpinned image '{ref}' (use @sha256:<digest>)")
+if bad:
+    for b in bad:
+        sys.stderr.write("IMAGE_UNPINNED " + b + "\n")
+    raise SystemExit(2)
+print("IMAGE_PIN_OK all images digest-pinned")
+PY
+    ;;
+  sign)
+    F="${1:-}"; KEY="${2:-}"
+    command -v openssl >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo "OPENSSL_UNAVAILABLE" >&2; exit 3; }
+    [[ -f "$F" && -f "$KEY" ]] || { echo "usage: supply-chain-integrity.sh sign <file> <priv-key>" >&2; exit 64; }
+    openssl dgst -sha256 -sign "$KEY" -out "$F.sig" "$F" 2>/dev/null \
+      && { echo "WORKFLOW_SIGNED file=$F"; exit 0; }
+    echo "WORKFLOW_SIGN_FAILED file=$F" >&2; exit 2
+    ;;
+  verify)
+    F="${1:-}"; KEY="${2:-}"
+    command -v openssl >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo "OPENSSL_UNAVAILABLE" >&2; exit 3; }
+    [[ -f "$F" ]] || { echo "WORKFLOW_MISSING file=$F" >&2; exit 3; }
+    [[ -f "$KEY" ]] || { echo "WORKFLOW_PUBKEY_MISSING key=$KEY" >&2; exit 3; }
+    [[ -f "$F.sig" ]] || { echo "WORKFLOW_UNSIGNED file=$F — refusing (fail-closed)" >&2; exit 3; }
+    if openssl dgst -sha256 -verify "$KEY" -signature "$F.sig" "$F" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+      echo "WORKFLOW_VERIFIED file=$F"; exit 0
+    fi
+    echo "WORKFLOW_INVALID file=$F — tampered or forged" >&2; exit 2
+    ;;
+  *)
+    echo "Usage: supply-chain-integrity.sh {image-pin <file>...|sign <file> <priv>|verify <file> <pub>}" >&2
+    exit 64
+    ;;
+esac