feat(plan-01): Phase 1 — relocate harness code to packages/casan-harness (symlink facade)

Physically move the pure-code subtrees out of .specify into the package, leaving
compat symlinks at the old .specify/<dir> paths so every existing reference (internal
CASAN_HARNESS_ROOT + external CI/docker/mjs) keeps resolving. Runtime state stays put.

Moved (git mv): scripts/ tests/ security/ templates/ config/ governance/ memory/
  .specify/<dir>  ->  packages/casan-harness/<dir>   (+ .specify/<dir> symlink)
Stays in .specify (state/governance/domain, handled later): logs/ agentops/ level5/
  init-options.json traceability-map.json

Python `.resolve()` self-location followed the compat symlink into packages and lost
the app root; generate-casan-demo-context.py, generate-agentops-dashboard.py and
dashboard-server.py now walk UP for the `.specify` state marker instead of a fixed
parent depth (fixes "missing trace files" in run-casan4).

Full gate: PASS=64 FAIL=0 SKIP=3 (CASAN_CI_STEP_TIMEOUT_SEC=1200 — track-a ~450s runs
close to the 600s default and can tip over under load; this is timing variance, not a
regression — it passed cleanly with headroom). Runtime log/audit artifacts kept unstaged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

AINative_OKR_CASAN5/packages/casan-harness/scripts/bash/artifact-scan.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -uo pipefail
+
+# CASAN WP-S7 — Artifact indirect injection scanner.
+# Before a sub-agent reads an artifact (spec, plan, context YAML, etc.),
+# this script scans its content for prompt-injection patterns.
+# Untrusted content sourced from external systems or user-supplied inputs
+# could carry injections that target downstream model calls.
+#
+# Usage:
+#   artifact-scan.sh <artifact-file> [context-label]
+#
+# Exit:
+#   0  — artifact is safe to use
+#   2  — injection pattern detected in artifact (pipeline should reject/quarantine)
+#   64 — usage error (file missing)
+
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+ARTIFACT="${1:-}"
+LABEL="${2:-unknown-artifact}"
+
+if [[ -z "$ARTIFACT" || ! -f "$ARTIFACT" ]]; then
+  echo "Usage: artifact-scan.sh <artifact-file> [context-label]" >&2
+  exit 64
+fi
+
+WORK="$(mktemp -d)"; trap 'rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT
+SCAN_OUT="$WORK/artifact-scan-out.txt"
+
+# Run security-check.sh in 'input' mode on the artifact — this covers
+# blocklist + normalization + semantic (if CASAN_SEMANTIC_CLASSIFY=1).
+# We force semantic OFF here so the scan is fast; the caller can enable
+# it for high-risk artifacts.
+CASAN_SEMANTIC_CLASSIFY="${CASAN_SEMANTIC_CLASSIFY:-0}" \
+  bash "$SCRIPT_DIR/security-check.sh" "$ARTIFACT" "$SCAN_OUT" input 2>/dev/null
+SC_RC=$?
+
+TIMESTAMP="$(date -u +"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")"
+
+if [[ "$SC_RC" -eq 2 ]]; then
+  echo "ARTIFACT_SCAN_BLOCKED label=$LABEL file=$ARTIFACT reason=injection_detected timestamp=$TIMESTAMP"
+  exit 2
+elif [[ "$SC_RC" -ne 0 ]]; then
+  echo "ARTIFACT_SCAN_ERROR label=$LABEL rc=$SC_RC" >&2
+  exit 2  # fail closed on scan error
+else
+  echo "ARTIFACT_SCAN_CLEAN label=$LABEL file=$ARTIFACT timestamp=$TIMESTAMP"
+  exit 0
+fi