feat(plan-01): Phase 1 — relocate harness code to packages/casan-harness (symlink facade)
Physically move the pure-code subtrees out of .specify into the package, leaving compat symlinks at the old .specify/<dir> paths so every existing reference (internal CASAN_HARNESS_ROOT + external CI/docker/mjs) keeps resolving. Runtime state stays put. Moved (git mv): scripts/ tests/ security/ templates/ config/ governance/ memory/ .specify/<dir> -> packages/casan-harness/<dir> (+ .specify/<dir> symlink) Stays in .specify (state/governance/domain, handled later): logs/ agentops/ level5/ init-options.json traceability-map.json Python `.resolve()` self-location followed the compat symlink into packages and lost the app root; generate-casan-demo-context.py, generate-agentops-dashboard.py and dashboard-server.py now walk UP for the `.specify` state marker instead of a fixed parent depth (fixes "missing trace files" in run-casan4). Full gate: PASS=64 FAIL=0 SKIP=3 (CASAN_CI_STEP_TIMEOUT_SEC=1200 — track-a ~450s runs close to the 600s default and can tip over under load; this is timing variance, not a regression — it passed cleanly with headroom). Runtime log/audit artifacts kept unstaged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
thanhnv
co-authored by
Claude Opus 4.8
Claude Opus 4.8
parent
2c765c9a45
commit
664bd1f00c
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
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set -uo pipefail
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# CASAN H5 — Signed/JWT approval verifier (Approval-identity MVP · C4 / V20).
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#
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# Problem: high-risk approval used to trust a plain env var (CASAN_APPROVER=bob) —
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# anyone who can set the env can "approve". This binds an approval to a REGISTERED
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# reviewer's cryptographic identity: the reviewer must SIGN this exact request with
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# their private key, AND their role must be authorized for the action class.
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#
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# The signed assertion is: casan-approval|v1|<action>|<actor>|<input_sha256>|<approver_id>
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# — so a signature for one request/reviewer cannot be replayed for another.
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#
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# Usage:
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# approval-verify.sh <action> <actor> <input-file> <approver-id> <sig-file>
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# CASAN_APPROVAL_JWT=<rs256-jwt> approval-verify.sh <action> <actor> <input-file> <approver-id> -
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# Registry (line format, no yaml dep):
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# reviewer <id> <role> <pubkey-file>
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# action <action-name|default> <comma,roles>
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# Env: CASAN_REVIEWERS_FILE (default governance/reviewers.registry)
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# CASAN_REVIEWERS_DIR (default governance/reviewers) — base dir for pubkey-file
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# CASAN_APPROVAL_JWT (optional RS256 IdP token)
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# CASAN_IDP_PUBLIC_KEY (default central-governance/idp-public.pem)
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# CASAN_IDP_JWKS_URL (optional OIDC JWKS endpoint; overrides public key)
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# CASAN_TRUSTED_TIME / CASAN_TRUSTED_TIME_FILE (SEC-22/ARCH-06: trusted time
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# source for JWT `exp` instead of the manipulable local clock; file
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# unreadable = fail-closed)
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# Exit: 0 ok (prints "APPROVAL_OK role=<role>"), 3 deny (reason on stderr), 64 usage.
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SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
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source "$SCRIPT_DIR/casan-paths.sh"
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PROJECT_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/../../.." && pwd)"
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GOV_DIR="$CASAN_GOVERNANCE_ROOT"
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REVIEWERS_FILE="${CASAN_REVIEWERS_FILE:-$GOV_DIR/reviewers.registry}"
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REVIEWERS_DIR="${CASAN_REVIEWERS_DIR:-$GOV_DIR/reviewers}"
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ACTION="${1:-}"; ACTOR="${2:-}"; INPUT_FILE="${3:-}"; APPROVER="${4:-}"; SIG_FILE="${5:-}"
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if [[ -z "$ACTION" || -z "$ACTOR" || -z "$INPUT_FILE" || -z "$APPROVER" ]]; then
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echo "Usage: approval-verify.sh <action> <actor> <input-file> <approver-id> <sig-file>" >&2
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exit 64
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fi
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deny() { echo "APPROVAL_DENIED reason=$1 approver=$APPROVER action=$ACTION" >&2; exit 3; }
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# SEC-30 (X-06): one-time-use. A verified approval token (JWT or offline signature)
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# is valid for its whole exp window, so it could be REPLAYED. Record a per-token
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# nonce (sha256 of the token/signature) and reject any repeat. Active in enforced
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# mode or when an explicit nonce ledger is configured (dev default: off).
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sha_stdin() {
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if command -v sha256sum >/dev/null 2>&1; then sha256sum | awk '{print $1}'
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else shasum -a 256 | awk '{print $1}'; fi
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}
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record_nonce_or_deny() {
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local nonce="$1"
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[[ "${CASAN_PROFILE:-}" == "prod" || -n "${CASAN_APPROVAL_NONCE_FILE:-}" ]] || return 0
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local ledger="${CASAN_APPROVAL_NONCE_FILE:-$CASAN_STATE_ROOT/logs/level5/approval-nonces.txt}"
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mkdir -p "$(dirname "$ledger")" 2>/dev/null || true
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if [[ -f "$ledger" ]] && grep -qxF "$nonce" "$ledger" 2>/dev/null; then
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deny "approval_replayed(nonce=${nonce:0:12}…)"
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fi
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printf '%s\n' "$nonce" >> "$ledger" || deny "nonce_ledger_unwritable"
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}
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[[ -f "$INPUT_FILE" ]] || deny "input_file_missing"
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[[ -f "$REVIEWERS_FILE" ]] || deny "reviewer_registry_missing"
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command -v openssl >/dev/null 2>&1 || deny "openssl_unavailable"
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hash_file() {
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if command -v sha256sum >/dev/null 2>&1; then sha256sum "$1" | awk '{print $1}'
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else shasum -a 256 "$1" | awk '{print $1}'; fi
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}
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INPUT_SHA="$(hash_file "$INPUT_FILE")"
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# Role authorization for this action (fallback to the "default" action policy).
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ROLES="$(awk -v a="$ACTION" '$1=="action" && $2==a {print $3; exit}' "$REVIEWERS_FILE")"
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[[ -n "$ROLES" ]] || ROLES="$(awk '$1=="action" && $2=="default" {print $3; exit}' "$REVIEWERS_FILE")"
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if [[ -n "${CASAN_APPROVAL_JWT:-}" ]]; then
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IDP_PUB="${CASAN_IDP_PUBLIC_KEY:-$GOV_DIR/idp-public.pem}"
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if [[ -n "${CASAN_IDP_JWKS_URL:-}" ]]; then
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IDP_PUB="jwks:${CASAN_IDP_JWKS_URL}"
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else
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[[ -f "$IDP_PUB" ]] || deny "idp_pubkey_missing($IDP_PUB)"
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fi
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JWT_OUT="$(
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python3 - "$CASAN_APPROVAL_JWT" "$IDP_PUB" "$APPROVER" "$ROLES" "$ACTION" "$ACTOR" "$INPUT_SHA" <<'PY'
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import base64
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import json
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import os
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import subprocess
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import sys
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import tempfile
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import time
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import urllib.request
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jwt, pub, approver, roles_csv, action, actor, input_sha = sys.argv[1:8]
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def die(reason):
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print(reason, file=sys.stderr)
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sys.exit(3)
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def b64u_decode(part):
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try:
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return base64.urlsafe_b64decode(part + "=" * (-len(part) % 4))
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except Exception:
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die("jwt_base64_invalid")
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parts = jwt.split(".")
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if len(parts) != 3:
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die("jwt_shape_invalid")
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header = json.loads(b64u_decode(parts[0]))
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claims = json.loads(b64u_decode(parts[1]))
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if header.get("alg") != "RS256":
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die("jwt_alg_not_allowed")
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# SEC-22 (ARCH-06): do NOT trust the local system clock alone for expiry. When a
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# trusted time source is provided (CASAN_TRUSTED_TIME seconds, or
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# CASAN_TRUSTED_TIME_FILE containing seconds from a trusted timestamp authority),
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# use it; an unreadable/invalid source is fail-closed (deny).
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def _trusted_now():
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v = os.environ.get("CASAN_TRUSTED_TIME")
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if v:
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try:
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return int(v)
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except Exception:
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die("trusted_time_invalid")
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f = os.environ.get("CASAN_TRUSTED_TIME_FILE")
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if f:
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try:
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return int(open(f).read().strip())
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except Exception:
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die("trusted_time_file_unreadable")
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return int(time.time())
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if int(claims.get("exp", 0)) <= _trusted_now():
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die("jwt_expired")
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if claims.get("sub") != approver:
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die("jwt_sub_mismatch")
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role = claims.get("role", "")
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roles = [r for r in roles_csv.split(",") if r]
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if role not in roles:
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die(f"jwt_role_not_authorized(role={role} allowed={roles_csv})")
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if claims.get("action") != action:
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die("jwt_action_mismatch")
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if claims.get("actor") != actor:
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die("jwt_actor_mismatch")
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if claims.get("input_sha256") != input_sha:
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die("jwt_input_hash_mismatch")
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sig = b64u_decode(parts[2])
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signing_input = ".".join(parts[:2]).encode()
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def der_len(n):
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if n < 128:
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return bytes([n])
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raw = n.to_bytes((n.bit_length() + 7) // 8, "big")
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return bytes([0x80 | len(raw)]) + raw
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def der_tlv(tag, body):
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return bytes([tag]) + der_len(len(body)) + body
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def der_int(n):
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raw = n.to_bytes((n.bit_length() + 7) // 8, "big") or b"\x00"
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if raw[0] & 0x80:
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raw = b"\x00" + raw
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return der_tlv(0x02, raw)
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def jwk_to_pem(jwk):
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n = int.from_bytes(b64u_decode(jwk["n"]), "big")
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e = int.from_bytes(b64u_decode(jwk["e"]), "big")
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rsa_pub = der_tlv(0x30, der_int(n) + der_int(e))
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alg_id = der_tlv(
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0x30,
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der_tlv(0x06, b"\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x01\x01\x01") + der_tlv(0x05, b""),
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)
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spki = der_tlv(0x30, alg_id + der_tlv(0x03, b"\x00" + rsa_pub))
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b64 = base64.encodebytes(spki).decode().replace("\n", "")
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lines = [b64[i:i+64] for i in range(0, len(b64), 64)]
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return "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\n" + "\n".join(lines) + "\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
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pub_file = pub
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with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
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sig_path = os.path.join(td, "sig.bin")
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msg_path = os.path.join(td, "msg.txt")
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open(sig_path, "wb").write(sig)
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open(msg_path, "wb").write(signing_input)
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if pub.startswith("jwks:"):
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try:
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jwks = json.loads(urllib.request.urlopen(pub[len("jwks:"):], timeout=5).read().decode())
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except Exception:
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die("jwks_fetch_failed")
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kid = header.get("kid")
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keys = [k for k in jwks.get("keys", []) if k.get("kty") == "RSA" and (not kid or k.get("kid") == kid)]
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if not keys:
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die("jwks_key_not_found")
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pub_file = os.path.join(td, "idp-public.pem")
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open(pub_file, "w", encoding="utf-8").write(jwk_to_pem(keys[0]))
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rc = subprocess.run(
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["openssl", "dgst", "-sha256", "-verify", pub_file, "-signature", sig_path, msg_path],
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stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
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stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
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).returncode
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if rc != 0:
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die("jwt_signature_invalid")
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print(f"OK role={role}")
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PY
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)" || deny "oidc_jwt_invalid(${JWT_OUT:-see_stderr})"
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ROLE="${JWT_OUT#OK role=}"
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record_nonce_or_deny "$(printf '%s' "$CASAN_APPROVAL_JWT" | sha_stdin)"
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echo "APPROVAL_OK mechanism=oidc role=$ROLE approver=$APPROVER action=$ACTION"
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exit 0
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fi
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[[ -n "$SIG_FILE" && -f "$SIG_FILE" ]] || deny "signature_missing"
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# Reviewer lookup (first matching registered reviewer).
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REV_LINE="$(awk -v id="$APPROVER" '$1=="reviewer" && $2==id {print $3" "$4; exit}' "$REVIEWERS_FILE")"
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[[ -n "$REV_LINE" ]] || deny "approver_not_registered"
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ROLE="${REV_LINE%% *}"
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PUB_REL="${REV_LINE##* }"
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case ",$ROLES," in
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*",$ROLE,"*) : ;;
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*) deny "approver_role_not_authorized(role=$ROLE action=$ACTION allowed=$ROLES)" ;;
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esac
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# Resolve pubkey path (absolute or relative to reviewers dir).
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PUB="$PUB_REL"; [[ "$PUB" = /* ]] || PUB="$REVIEWERS_DIR/$PUB_REL"
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[[ -f "$PUB" ]] || deny "approver_pubkey_missing($PUB)"
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# Rebuild the exact signed assertion and verify.
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MSG="casan-approval|v1|$ACTION|$ACTOR|$INPUT_SHA|$APPROVER"
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TMP="$(mktemp)"; trap 'rm -f "$TMP"' EXIT
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printf '%s' "$MSG" > "$TMP"
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openssl dgst -sha256 -verify "$PUB" -signature "$SIG_FILE" "$TMP" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
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|| deny "approval_signature_invalid"
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record_nonce_or_deny "$(sha_stdin < "$SIG_FILE")"
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echo "APPROVAL_OK role=$ROLE approver=$APPROVER action=$ACTION"
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exit 0
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