refactor(structure): promote app to repo root + remove redundant workspace cruft
Standard production layout: the OKR app (was nested under AINative_OKR_CASAN5/) is now
the repository root. No more wrapper directory.
- Promote AINative_OKR_CASAN5/* -> repo root (backend/ frontend/ packages/ apps/
.specify/ docs/ infra/ nginx/ scripts/ + configs). Merge tool dirs: .gitea (kept the
active deploy ci.yml, added harness-ci.yml + runbooks), .claude (agents/commands +
launch.json), .github moved up.
- Remove redundant: 00_SUBMISSION_PACKAGE, scattered root notes (FPT_CASAN_Full.md,
tu-tuong-casan.md, casan-tu-sinh..., casan_harness_assessment.md, source-review...,
README_CASAN5_REFINED.md), casan-next-plans/ and optimize-docs/ (competition/planning
artifacts — roadmap + design history preserved in git log / commit messages).
- Update all references to the old layout:
- .gitea/workflows/{ci,harness-ci}.yml, .github/workflows/{ci,deploy}.yml:
working-directory .; drop AINative_OKR_CASAN5/ prefix; .specify/{tests,scripts}
-> packages/casan-harness/... (.specify/logs state kept)
- .claude/launch.json, .gitea/*-runbook.md: path prefixes
- CLAUDE.md, README.md: docs/input -> apps/okr/domain/input
- policy-bundle.yaml: 8 policy paths -> packages/casan-harness/...; manifest re-signed
- secrets-scan.sh: fixture excludes -> new package/domain paths.
Full gate from the new root: PASS=64 FAIL=0 SKIP=3.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
thanhnv
co-authored by
Claude Opus 4.8
Claude Opus 4.8
parent
7101af9fd4
commit
36a4812ef3
@@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
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#!/usr/bin/env pwsh
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# CASAN H4 Security Harness - PowerShell port of security-check.sh
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# Usage:
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# security-check.ps1 <input-file> <output-file> [input|output]
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#
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# input mode: blocks prompt injection / jailbreak / secrets, masks PII.
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# output mode: redacts PII/secrets from generated output, flags risky language.
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# Exit codes: 0=pass, 2=blocked, 64=usage error
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param(
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[Parameter(Mandatory=$true, Position=0)][string]$InputFile,
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[Parameter(Mandatory=$true, Position=1)][string]$OutputFile,
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[Parameter(Position=2)][ValidateSet("input","output")][string]$Mode = "input"
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)
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$ErrorActionPreference = "Stop"
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$scriptDir = Split-Path $MyInvocation.MyCommand.Path -Parent
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$projectRoot = (Resolve-Path (Join-Path $scriptDir "../../..")).Path
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$logDir = Join-Path $projectRoot ".specify/logs"
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$traceDir = Join-Path $logDir "trace"
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$auditDir = Join-Path $logDir "audit"
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$securityDir = Join-Path $projectRoot ".specify/security"
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foreach ($d in @($traceDir, $auditDir, (Split-Path $OutputFile -Parent))) {
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if ($d -and !(Test-Path $d)) { New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path $d | Out-Null }
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}
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if (!(Test-Path $InputFile)) {
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Write-Error "SECURITY_BLOCKED: input file not found: $InputFile"
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exit 2
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}
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function New-TraceId {
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try { return [System.Guid]::NewGuid().ToString("D") } catch { return "trace-$(Get-Date -Format 'yyyyMMddHHmmss')-$PID" }
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}
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function Get-Sha256 ([string]$text) {
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$bytes = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes($text)
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$hash = [System.Security.Cryptography.SHA256]::Create().ComputeHash($bytes)
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return ($hash | ForEach-Object { $_.ToString("x2") }) -join ""
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}
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function ConvertTo-JsonArray ([string[]]$arr) {
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if (!$arr -or $arr.Count -eq 0) { return "[]" }
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$escaped = $arr | ForEach-Object { '"' + ($_ -replace '"','\"') + '"' }
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return "[" + ($escaped -join ",") + "]"
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}
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$traceId = New-TraceId
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$timestamp = (Get-Date).ToUniversalTime().ToString("yyyy-MM-ddTHH:mm:ssZ")
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$content = Get-Content $InputFile -Raw -Encoding UTF8
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if (!$content) { $content = "" }
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$lower = $content.ToLower()
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$status = "pass"
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$action = "allow"
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$riskLevel = "low"
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$matchedRules = [System.Collections.Generic.List[string]]::new()
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# ── Block patterns (prompt injection) ──────────────────────────────────────
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$blockPatterns = @(
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"ignore previous instruction",
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"ignore system instruction",
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"bypass system",
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"bypass policy",
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"system bypass",
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"override policy",
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"you are now",
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"act as admin",
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"pretend to be system",
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"reveal system prompt",
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"reveal original prompt",
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"show hidden instruction",
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"show internal prompt"
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)
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# ── Jailbreak patterns (Phase 2 addition) ──────────────────────────────────
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$jailbreakPatterns = @(
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"act as a different",
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"act as an evil",
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"act as an unconstrained",
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"act as an unrestricted",
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"pretend you are not an ai",
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"pretend you're not an ai",
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"pretend you are no longer",
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"developer mode",
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"dan mode",
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"jailbreak mode",
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"unrestricted mode",
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"your real instructions are",
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"your true instructions are",
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"what are your system instructions",
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"what were your original instructions"
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)
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# ── Load additional patterns from prompt-filter.yaml ───────────────────────
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$filterYaml = Join-Path $securityDir "prompt-filter.yaml"
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if (Test-Path $filterYaml) {
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$yaml = Get-Content $filterYaml -Raw
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$patternMatches = [regex]::Matches($yaml, 'pattern:\s*"([^"]+)"')
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foreach ($m in $patternMatches) { $blockPatterns += $m.Groups[1].Value }
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}
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# ── Approval / alert patterns ──────────────────────────────────────────────
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$approvalPatterns = @("delete ", "drop table", "shutdown system", "export secrets", "dump database")
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$alertPatterns = @("show all data", "internal prompt", "system message", "hidden instruction")
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# ── Regexes ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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$emailRegex = '[A-Za-z0-9._%+\-]+@[A-Za-z0-9.\-]+\.[A-Za-z]{2,}'
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$phoneRegex = '(\+?[0-9][0-9 .\-]{8,}[0-9])'
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$personalIdReg = '\b[0-9]{9,12}\b'
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$creditCardReg = '\b([0-9]{4}[- ]?){3}[0-9]{4}\b'
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$secretRegex = '(?i)(API[_\-]?KEY|ACCESS[_\-]?TOKEN|REFRESH[_\-]?TOKEN|PASSWORD|JWT[_\-]?SECRET|SECRET)\s*[:=]\s*\S+'
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$credentialReg = '(?i)(postgres|mysql|mongodb)://[^@]+@' # connection strings
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$awsKeyReg = 'AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}'
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if ($Mode -eq "input") {
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# Block patterns check
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foreach ($p in ($blockPatterns + $jailbreakPatterns)) {
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if ($p -and $lower -match [regex]::Escape($p)) {
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$status = "blocked"; $action = "block"; $riskLevel = "high"
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$matchedRules.Add("prompt-injection:$p")
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}
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}
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# Credit card PII
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if ($content -match $creditCardReg) {
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$status = "blocked"; $action = "block"; $riskLevel = "high"
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$matchedRules.Add("pii-credit-card")
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}
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# Hardcoded secrets / credentials (Phase 2 addition)
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if (($content -match $secretRegex) -or ($content -match $credentialReg) -or ($content -match $awsKeyReg)) {
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$status = "blocked"; $action = "block"; $riskLevel = "high"
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$matchedRules.Add("secret-in-input")
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}
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# Approval patterns (only if not already blocked)
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if ($status -ne "blocked") {
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foreach ($p in $approvalPatterns) {
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if ($lower -match [regex]::Escape($p)) {
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$status = "requires_approval"; $action = "require_approval"; $riskLevel = "high"
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$matchedRules.Add("unsafe-action:$p")
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}
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}
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}
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# Alert patterns
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if ($status -ne "blocked") {
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foreach ($p in $alertPatterns) {
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if ($lower -match [regex]::Escape($p)) {
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if ($riskLevel -eq "low") { $riskLevel = "medium" }
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$action = "alert"
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$matchedRules.Add("suspicious:$p")
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}
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}
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}
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}
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# ── PII masking + secret redaction (both modes) ───────────────────────────
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$safeContent = $content
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$safeContent = [regex]::Replace($safeContent, $emailRegex, '***MASKED_EMAIL***')
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$safeContent = [regex]::Replace($safeContent, $phoneRegex, '***MASKED_PHONE***')
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$safeContent = [regex]::Replace($safeContent, $personalIdReg, '***MASKED_ID***')
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$safeContent = [regex]::Replace($safeContent, $secretRegex, '[REDACTED_SECRET]')
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$safeContent = [regex]::Replace($safeContent, $credentialReg, '[REDACTED_CONNSTRING]://')
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$safeContent = [regex]::Replace($safeContent, $awsKeyReg, '[REDACTED_AWSKEY]')
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if ($Mode -eq "output") {
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if ($content -match $secretRegex) {
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$action = "redact"
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if ($riskLevel -eq "low") { $riskLevel = "medium" }
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$matchedRules.Add("secret-redacted-output")
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}
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if ($lower -match "(maybe|might be incorrect|i am not sure|uncertain)") {
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$action = "flag"
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if ($riskLevel -eq "low") { $riskLevel = "medium" }
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$matchedRules.Add("hallucination-risk-language")
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}
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}
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# ── Hash ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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$inputHash = Get-Sha256 $content
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$outputHash = Get-Sha256 $safeContent
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$rulesJson = ConvertTo-JsonArray ($matchedRules.ToArray())
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# ── Trace JSON ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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$traceFile = Join-Path $traceDir "security-$traceId.json"
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@"
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{
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"trace_id": "$traceId",
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"timestamp": "$timestamp",
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"harness": "H4-security",
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"mode": "$Mode",
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"status": "$status",
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"action": "$action",
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"risk_level": "$riskLevel",
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"matched_rules": $rulesJson,
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"input_hash": "$inputHash",
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"output_hash": "$outputHash"
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}
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"@ | Set-Content -Path $traceFile -Encoding UTF8
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# ── Audit JSONL ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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$auditLine = "{`"timestamp`":`"$timestamp`",`"trace_id`":`"$traceId`",`"harness`":`"H4-security`",`"mode`":`"$Mode`",`"status`":`"$status`",`"action`":`"$action`",`"risk_level`":`"$riskLevel`",`"input_hash`":`"$inputHash`",`"output_hash`":`"$outputHash`"}"
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Add-Content -Path (Join-Path $auditDir "security.jsonl") -Value $auditLine -Encoding UTF8
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# ── Result ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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if ($status -eq "blocked") {
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Set-Content -Path $OutputFile -Value "" -Encoding UTF8
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Write-Error "SECURITY_BLOCKED trace_id=$traceId risk=$riskLevel rules=$rulesJson"
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exit 2
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}
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Set-Content -Path $OutputFile -Value $safeContent -Encoding UTF8
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Write-Output "SECURITY_$($status.ToUpper()) trace_id=$traceId risk=$riskLevel action=$action output=$OutputFile"
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exit 0
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