refactor(structure): promote app to repo root + remove redundant workspace cruft
Standard production layout: the OKR app (was nested under AINative_OKR_CASAN5/) is now
the repository root. No more wrapper directory.
- Promote AINative_OKR_CASAN5/* -> repo root (backend/ frontend/ packages/ apps/
.specify/ docs/ infra/ nginx/ scripts/ + configs). Merge tool dirs: .gitea (kept the
active deploy ci.yml, added harness-ci.yml + runbooks), .claude (agents/commands +
launch.json), .github moved up.
- Remove redundant: 00_SUBMISSION_PACKAGE, scattered root notes (FPT_CASAN_Full.md,
tu-tuong-casan.md, casan-tu-sinh..., casan_harness_assessment.md, source-review...,
README_CASAN5_REFINED.md), casan-next-plans/ and optimize-docs/ (competition/planning
artifacts — roadmap + design history preserved in git log / commit messages).
- Update all references to the old layout:
- .gitea/workflows/{ci,harness-ci}.yml, .github/workflows/{ci,deploy}.yml:
working-directory .; drop AINative_OKR_CASAN5/ prefix; .specify/{tests,scripts}
-> packages/casan-harness/... (.specify/logs state kept)
- .claude/launch.json, .gitea/*-runbook.md: path prefixes
- CLAUDE.md, README.md: docs/input -> apps/okr/domain/input
- policy-bundle.yaml: 8 policy paths -> packages/casan-harness/...; manifest re-signed
- secrets-scan.sh: fixture excludes -> new package/domain paths.
Full gate from the new root: PASS=64 FAIL=0 SKIP=3.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
thanhnv
co-authored by
Claude Opus 4.8
Claude Opus 4.8
parent
7101af9fd4
commit
36a4812ef3
+207
@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# CASAN H5 — HashiCorp Vault KMS helper
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#
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# Provides Vault-backed signing operations as a drop-in replacement for
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# direct openssl key-file usage. Scripts detect KMS availability via:
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# [[ -n "${VAULT_ADDR:-}" && -n "${VAULT_TOKEN:-}" ]]
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#
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# Usage (direct):
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# vault-kms.sh sign <file> <output.sig> [key_name]
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# vault-kms.sh verify <file> <sig_file> [key_name]
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# vault-kms.sh pubkey <output.pem> [key_name]
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# vault-kms.sh status
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#
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# Usage (sourced):
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# source vault-kms.sh
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# vault_kms_sign <file> <output.sig> [key_name]
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# vault_kms_pubkey <output.pem> [key_name]
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# vault_kms_status
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#
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# Environment:
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# VAULT_ADDR — e.g. http://vault:8200 or http://161.33.139.73:8200
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# VAULT_TOKEN — root token or policy token with transit/sign/* capability
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set -euo pipefail
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: "${VAULT_ADDR:?VAULT_ADDR must be set}"
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: "${VAULT_TOKEN:?VAULT_TOKEN must be set}"
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_VAULT_DEFAULT_KEY="casan-policy-key"
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_VAULT_AUDIT_KEY="casan-audit-key"
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# ── Ensure required tools ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
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_check_deps() {
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for cmd in curl python3; do
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command -v "$cmd" >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo "vault-kms: required: $cmd" >&2; exit 1; }
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done
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}
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# ── Transit: ensure key exists ────────────────────────────────────────────
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vault_kms_ensure_key() {
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local key="${1:-$_VAULT_DEFAULT_KEY}"
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local status
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status=$(curl -sf \
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-H "X-Vault-Token: $VAULT_TOKEN" \
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"$VAULT_ADDR/v1/transit/keys/$key" 2>/dev/null | \
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python3 -c "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print('ok' if 'data' in d else 'missing')" 2>/dev/null || echo "missing")
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if [[ "$status" != "ok" ]]; then
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curl -sf -X POST \
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-H "X-Vault-Token: $VAULT_TOKEN" \
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-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
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-d '{"type":"rsa-2048","exportable":false,"allow_plaintext_backup":false}' \
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"$VAULT_ADDR/v1/transit/keys/$key" >/dev/null
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echo "vault-kms: created transit key: $key" >&2
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fi
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}
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# ── Sign a file ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Produces a DER binary signature compatible with:
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# openssl dgst -sha256 -verify pub.pem -signature <output.sig> <file>
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vault_kms_sign() {
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local file="$1" output="$2" key="${3:-$_VAULT_DEFAULT_KEY}"
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_check_deps
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vault_kms_ensure_key "$key"
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# Base64-encode the file content for the Vault API payload
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local input_b64
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input_b64=$(base64 -w0 < "$file" 2>/dev/null || base64 < "$file")
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# Call Vault Transit sign — PKCS#1 v1.5 + SHA-256 (compatible with openssl verify)
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local response
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response=$(curl -sf -X POST \
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-H "X-Vault-Token: $VAULT_TOKEN" \
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-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
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-d "{\"input\":\"$input_b64\",\"hash_algorithm\":\"sha2-256\",\"signature_algorithm\":\"pkcs1v15\",\"prehashed\":false}" \
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"$VAULT_ADDR/v1/transit/sign/$key") || {
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echo "vault-kms: sign request failed (key=$key)" >&2; exit 1
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}
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# Extract signature and strip the "vault:v1:" prefix → raw base64 DER bytes
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local sig_b64
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sig_b64=$(printf '%s' "$response" | python3 -c "
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import sys, json
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d = json.load(sys.stdin)
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sig = d['data']['signature']
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# vault:v1:<base64> → keep only base64 part
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print(sig.split(':')[-1])
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")
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# Decode base64 → binary DER file (identical format to openssl -sign output)
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printf '%s' "$sig_b64" | base64 -d > "$output"
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echo "vault-kms: signed $file → $output (key=$key anchor=vault-kms)" >&2
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}
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# ── Export public key ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Writes the RSA public key as PEM so openssl dgst -verify still works.
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vault_kms_pubkey() {
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local output="$1" key="${2:-$_VAULT_DEFAULT_KEY}"
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_check_deps
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vault_kms_ensure_key "$key"
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local response
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response=$(curl -sf \
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-H "X-Vault-Token: $VAULT_TOKEN" \
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"$VAULT_ADDR/v1/transit/keys/$key") || {
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echo "vault-kms: pubkey fetch failed (key=$key)" >&2; exit 1
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}
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local tmp_resp
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tmp_resp=$(mktemp)
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printf '%s' "$response" > "$tmp_resp"
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python3 - "$output" "$tmp_resp" <<'PY'
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import sys, json
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output = sys.argv[1]
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with open(sys.argv[2]) as f:
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d = json.loads(f.read())
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keys = d["data"]["keys"]
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# keys is a dict; pick the latest version
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latest = max(keys.keys(), key=lambda k: int(k))
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pub = keys[latest]["public_key"]
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with open(output, "w") as f:
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f.write(pub if pub.endswith("\n") else pub + "\n")
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print(f"vault-kms: public key written to {output}", file=sys.stderr)
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PY
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rm -f "$tmp_resp"
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}
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# ── Verify a signature ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Uses openssl with the public key exported from Vault.
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vault_kms_verify() {
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local file="$1" sig_file="$2" key="${3:-$_VAULT_DEFAULT_KEY}"
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local tmp_pub
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tmp_pub=$(mktemp /tmp/vault-pub-XXXXX.pem)
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trap 'rm -f "$tmp_pub"' RETURN
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vault_kms_pubkey "$tmp_pub" "$key"
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openssl dgst -sha256 -verify "$tmp_pub" -signature "$sig_file" "$file" >/dev/null
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}
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# ── Connectivity check ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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vault_kms_status() {
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if curl -sf "$VAULT_ADDR/v1/sys/health" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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echo "VAULT_KMS_AVAILABLE addr=$VAULT_ADDR"
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return 0
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else
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echo "VAULT_KMS_UNAVAILABLE addr=${VAULT_ADDR:-unset}"
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return 1
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fi
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}
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# ── Enable transit engine (idempotent) ────────────────────────────────────
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vault_kms_enable_transit() {
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curl -sf -X POST \
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-H "X-Vault-Token: $VAULT_TOKEN" \
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-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
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-d '{"type":"transit"}' \
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"$VAULT_ADDR/v1/sys/mounts/transit" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
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}
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# ── Rotate a transit key (new version; old versions retained) ──────────────
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# Key rotation is a core KMS/HSM property: sign future heads with a fresh key
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# version without exporting or exposing any private material.
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vault_kms_rotate() {
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local key="${1:-$_VAULT_AUDIT_KEY}"
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_check_deps
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vault_kms_ensure_key "$key"
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curl -sf -X POST \
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-H "X-Vault-Token: $VAULT_TOKEN" \
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"$VAULT_ADDR/v1/transit/keys/$key/rotate" >/dev/null 2>&1 || {
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echo "vault-kms: rotate failed (key=$key)" >&2; return 1; }
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local ver
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ver=$(curl -sf -H "X-Vault-Token: $VAULT_TOKEN" "$VAULT_ADDR/v1/transit/keys/$key" \
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| python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['data'].get('latest_version','?'))" 2>/dev/null || echo "?")
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echo "VAULT_KMS_ROTATED key=$key latest_version=$ver"
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}
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# ── Prove non-exportability: an export attempt MUST fail for a KMS key ──────
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# Returns 0 if the key is NON-exportable (export denied) — the desired state.
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vault_kms_assert_nonexportable() {
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local key="${1:-$_VAULT_AUDIT_KEY}"
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if curl -sf -H "X-Vault-Token: $VAULT_TOKEN" \
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"$VAULT_ADDR/v1/transit/export/signing-key/$key" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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echo "VAULT_KMS_KEY_EXPORTABLE key=$key (INSECURE — key material can leave KMS)" >&2
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return 1
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fi
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echo "VAULT_KMS_KEY_NONEXPORTABLE key=$key (private material never leaves KMS)"
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return 0
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}
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# ── CLI entrypoint ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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if [[ "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}" == "${0}" ]]; then
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CMD="${1:-status}"
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shift || true
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case "$CMD" in
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sign) vault_kms_sign "$@" ;;
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pubkey) vault_kms_pubkey "$@" ;;
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verify) vault_kms_verify "$@" ;;
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status) vault_kms_status ;;
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enable-transit) vault_kms_enable_transit ;;
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ensure-key) vault_kms_ensure_key "${1:-}" ;;
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rotate) vault_kms_rotate "${1:-}" ;;
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assert-nonexportable) vault_kms_assert_nonexportable "${1:-}" ;;
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*)
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echo "Usage: vault-kms.sh {sign|pubkey|verify|status|enable-transit|ensure-key|rotate|assert-nonexportable}" >&2
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exit 64
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;;
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esac
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fi
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