refactor(structure): promote app to repo root + remove redundant workspace cruft
Standard production layout: the OKR app (was nested under AINative_OKR_CASAN5/) is now
the repository root. No more wrapper directory.
- Promote AINative_OKR_CASAN5/* -> repo root (backend/ frontend/ packages/ apps/
.specify/ docs/ infra/ nginx/ scripts/ + configs). Merge tool dirs: .gitea (kept the
active deploy ci.yml, added harness-ci.yml + runbooks), .claude (agents/commands +
launch.json), .github moved up.
- Remove redundant: 00_SUBMISSION_PACKAGE, scattered root notes (FPT_CASAN_Full.md,
tu-tuong-casan.md, casan-tu-sinh..., casan_harness_assessment.md, source-review...,
README_CASAN5_REFINED.md), casan-next-plans/ and optimize-docs/ (competition/planning
artifacts — roadmap + design history preserved in git log / commit messages).
- Update all references to the old layout:
- .gitea/workflows/{ci,harness-ci}.yml, .github/workflows/{ci,deploy}.yml:
working-directory .; drop AINative_OKR_CASAN5/ prefix; .specify/{tests,scripts}
-> packages/casan-harness/... (.specify/logs state kept)
- .claude/launch.json, .gitea/*-runbook.md: path prefixes
- CLAUDE.md, README.md: docs/input -> apps/okr/domain/input
- policy-bundle.yaml: 8 policy paths -> packages/casan-harness/...; manifest re-signed
- secrets-scan.sh: fixture excludes -> new package/domain paths.
Full gate from the new root: PASS=64 FAIL=0 SKIP=3.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
thanhnv
co-authored by
Claude Opus 4.8
Claude Opus 4.8
parent
7101af9fd4
commit
36a4812ef3
@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
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"""CASAN self-improve core (Plan-04, harness-owned).
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Reads real telemetry (provider-usage / metrics JSONL + optional drift report) and
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emits improvement PROPOSALS (dry-run, never writes). Applying a proposal requires
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human approval (`--approval`) and goes through the governed settings store
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(control-plane-settings.py) so every change is audited. Loosen / security-sensitive
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proposals always require approval.
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Subcommands:
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propose --metrics <jsonl> [--drift <json>] -> proposals JSON on stdout (no writes)
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apply --proposals <json> --id <ID> [--approval <tok>] -> governed set (needs approval)
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"""
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import argparse
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import json
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import os
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import statistics
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import subprocess
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import sys
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def read_jsonl(path):
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rows = []
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if not path or not os.path.isfile(path):
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return rows
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with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as fh:
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for line in fh:
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line = line.strip()
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if not line:
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continue
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try:
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rows.append(json.loads(line))
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except ValueError:
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continue
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return rows
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def build_proposals(metrics_rows, drift):
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proposals = []
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costs = [r["cost_usd"] for r in metrics_rows if isinstance(r.get("cost_usd"), (int, float))]
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if costs:
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cap = round(max(costs) * 1.5, 4)
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proposals.append({
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"id": "P-COST-CAP",
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"type": "calibrate_cost_cap",
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"key": "cost.absolute_cap_usd",
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"value": cap,
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"direction": "tighten",
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"security_sensitive": False,
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"reason": f"observed max cost {max(costs)}; set cap to 1.5x = {cap}",
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})
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if drift and (drift.get("drift") is True or drift.get("entries")):
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proposals.append({
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"id": "P-GOLDEN",
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"type": "update_golden",
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"key": None,
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"value": None,
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"direction": "loosen",
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"security_sensitive": True,
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"reason": "drift detected; updating golden may hide real regressions — needs review",
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})
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return proposals
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def verify_metrics_integrity(path, sig, pub):
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"""True only if the metrics file has a valid detached signature (openssl).
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ARCH-08: proposals from telemetry that is not integrity-verified are marked
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untrusted so a reviewer (and the apply gate) treats them with suspicion."""
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if not (path and sig and pub):
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return False
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if not (os.path.isfile(path) and os.path.isfile(sig) and os.path.isfile(pub)):
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return False
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try:
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r = subprocess.run(
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["openssl", "dgst", "-sha256", "-verify", pub, "-signature", sig, path],
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capture_output=True,
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)
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return r.returncode == 0
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except Exception:
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return False
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def cmd_propose(args):
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metrics = read_jsonl(args.metrics)
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drift = None
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if args.drift and os.path.isfile(args.drift):
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try:
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drift = json.load(open(args.drift, encoding="utf-8"))
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except ValueError:
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drift = None
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# ARCH-08 telemetry-poisoning defence: tag every proposal with the trust level
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# of its source telemetry. Unsigned/unverifiable metrics -> untrusted.
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trusted = verify_metrics_integrity(args.metrics, args.metrics_sig, args.metrics_pub)
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source_trust = "verified" if trusted else "untrusted"
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proposals = build_proposals(metrics, drift)
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for p in proposals:
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p["source_trust"] = source_trust
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print(json.dumps({"proposals": proposals, "count": len(proposals),
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"source_trust": source_trust}, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2))
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return 0
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def cmd_apply(args):
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try:
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data = json.load(open(args.proposals, encoding="utf-8"))
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except (OSError, ValueError):
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print(f"IMPROVE_DENY PROPOSALS_UNREADABLE {args.proposals}", file=sys.stderr)
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return 1
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proposal = next((p for p in data.get("proposals", []) if p.get("id") == args.id), None)
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if proposal is None:
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print(f"IMPROVE_DENY UNKNOWN_PROPOSAL {args.id}", file=sys.stderr)
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return 1
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# ARCH-08: in enforced mode (prod / CASAN_SELFIMPROVE_STRICT=1) refuse to apply a
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# proposal derived from unverified telemetry unless explicitly allowed with
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# justification. Dev default only tags (backward compatible). Missing tag =
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# untrusted (fail-closed).
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enforced = (os.environ.get("CASAN_PROFILE") == "prod"
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or os.environ.get("CASAN_SELFIMPROVE_STRICT") == "1")
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if (proposal.get("source_trust", "untrusted") == "untrusted"
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and enforced and not args.allow_untrusted):
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print(f"IMPROVE_DENY UNTRUSTED_SOURCE {args.id} (telemetry not integrity-verified; "
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f"re-run propose with --metrics-sig/--metrics-pub, or pass --allow-untrusted)",
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file=sys.stderr)
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return 1
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# Proposal != application: applying ALWAYS requires human approval (Plan-04).
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if not (args.approval or "").strip():
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print(f"IMPROVE_DENY APPROVAL_REQUIRED {args.id}", file=sys.stderr)
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return 1
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if proposal.get("key") is None:
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# Non-settings proposal (e.g. update_golden) — record intent, no auto-apply.
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print(f"IMPROVE_MANUAL {args.id} type={proposal.get('type')} (no auto-apply; do it under review)")
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return 0
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cps = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), "control-plane-settings.py")
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cmd = [
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sys.executable, cps, "set", proposal["key"], json.dumps(proposal["value"]),
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"--actor", "casan-improve", "--reason", f"auto-improve {args.id}",
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]
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if proposal.get("security_sensitive"):
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cmd += ["--approval", args.approval]
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result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)
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if result.returncode != 0:
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print(f"IMPROVE_DENY GOVERNED_SET_FAILED {result.stderr.strip()}", file=sys.stderr)
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return 1
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print(f"IMPROVE_APPLIED {args.id} key={proposal['key']} value={proposal['value']}")
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return 0
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def main() -> int:
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ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
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sub = ap.add_subparsers(dest="cmd", required=True)
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pr = sub.add_parser("propose")
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pr.add_argument("--metrics", default="")
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pr.add_argument("--drift", default="")
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pr.add_argument("--metrics-sig", default="")
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pr.add_argument("--metrics-pub", default="")
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ap_ = sub.add_parser("apply")
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ap_.add_argument("--proposals", required=True)
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ap_.add_argument("--id", required=True)
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ap_.add_argument("--approval", default="")
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ap_.add_argument("--allow-untrusted", action="store_true")
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args = ap.parse_args()
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if args.cmd == "propose":
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return cmd_propose(args)
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if args.cmd == "apply":
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return cmd_apply(args)
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return 2
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if __name__ == "__main__":
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raise SystemExit(main())
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