refactor(structure): promote app to repo root + remove redundant workspace cruft

Standard production layout: the OKR app (was nested under AINative_OKR_CASAN5/) is now
the repository root. No more wrapper directory.

- Promote AINative_OKR_CASAN5/* -> repo root (backend/ frontend/ packages/ apps/
  .specify/ docs/ infra/ nginx/ scripts/ + configs). Merge tool dirs: .gitea (kept the
  active deploy ci.yml, added harness-ci.yml + runbooks), .claude (agents/commands +
  launch.json), .github moved up.
- Remove redundant: 00_SUBMISSION_PACKAGE, scattered root notes (FPT_CASAN_Full.md,
  tu-tuong-casan.md, casan-tu-sinh..., casan_harness_assessment.md, source-review...,
  README_CASAN5_REFINED.md), casan-next-plans/ and optimize-docs/ (competition/planning
  artifacts — roadmap + design history preserved in git log / commit messages).
- Update all references to the old layout:
  - .gitea/workflows/{ci,harness-ci}.yml, .github/workflows/{ci,deploy}.yml:
    working-directory .; drop AINative_OKR_CASAN5/ prefix; .specify/{tests,scripts}
    -> packages/casan-harness/... (.specify/logs state kept)
  - .claude/launch.json, .gitea/*-runbook.md: path prefixes
  - CLAUDE.md, README.md: docs/input -> apps/okr/domain/input
  - policy-bundle.yaml: 8 policy paths -> packages/casan-harness/...; manifest re-signed
- secrets-scan.sh: fixture excludes -> new package/domain paths.

Full gate from the new root: PASS=64 FAIL=0 SKIP=3.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
thanhnv
2026-07-08 13:26:36 +09:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 4.8
parent 7101af9fd4
commit 36a4812ef3
925 changed files with 410 additions and 18001 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
# CASAN Plan-16 SEC-10 — agent-identity registry (non-spoofable least-privilege).
#
# tool-registry-gate.sh least-privilege used to trust CASAN_AGENT (a plain env var
# anyone can set). Under CASAN_PROFILE=prod (or CASAN_IDENTITY_STRICT=1) the caller
# must instead present a signed token proving it is that agent — verified against
# one of the PUBLIC keys below. Private keys live OFF-REPO (with the agent runner /
# issued by an IdP); only public keys are provisioned here (same policy as the audit
# and reviewer signing keys).
#
# Line format (no yaml dependency):
# agent <agent-id> <pubkey-file> # pubkey-file relative to the agents/ dir
#
# Token minted with: agent-identity-sign.sh <agent-id> <run-id> <priv> <sig-out>
# Presented via: CASAN_AGENT=<id> CASAN_AGENT_SIG=<sig> CASAN_RUN_ID=<run>
#
# NOTE: pubkeys under agents/ are provisioned out-of-band by ops. Until then,
# enforced mode fails CLOSED (an unproven agent is denied every restricted tool).
agent release-manager release-manager.pub.pem
agent implement-agent implement-agent.pub.pem
agent design-agent design-agent.pub.pem
agent review-agent review-agent.pub.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
version: 1.0
bundle_id: casan-okr-harness-policy
owner: ai-governance-board
description: Central policy bundle for CASAN Level 5 governance
policies:
- id: h4-prompt-filter
path: .specify/security/prompt-filter.yaml
owner: security-team
required: true
- id: h4-output-policy
path: .specify/security/output-policy.yaml
owner: security-team
required: true
- id: h5-approval-flow
path: .specify/governance/approval-flow.yaml
owner: governance-team
required: true
- id: h5-risk-registry
path: .specify/governance/risk-registry.yaml
owner: governance-team
required: true
- id: h6-metrics
path: .specify/agentops/metrics.yaml
owner: agentops-team
required: true
- id: l5-tool-registry
path: .specify/level5/tool-registry.yaml
owner: platform-team
required: true
- id: l5-fallback
path: .specify/level5/model-fallback.yaml
owner: platform-team
required: true
- id: l5-drift
path: .specify/level5/drift-policy.yaml
owner: quality-team
required: true
approval:
signing_required: true
approver_group: ai-governance-board
verification_script: .specify/scripts/bash/sign-policy-bundle.sh
evidence:
manifest: .specify/level5/central-governance/policy-manifest.json
signature: .specify/level5/central-governance/policy-manifest.sig
public_key: .specify/level5/central-governance/policy-public.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
{
"bundle_id": "casan-okr-harness-policy",
"files": [
{
"bytes": 5820,
"path": ".specify/security/prompt-filter.yaml",
"sha256": "4e9fbd21218b320082ef4f46a8fca90380d278b3768a0fe8f259f4bd917bb8d9"
},
{
"bytes": 1255,
"path": ".specify/security/output-policy.yaml",
"sha256": "742f73c04a3a2bdab88c140fc18299ece8ef63b093da221350452c555132cf05"
},
{
"bytes": 1935,
"path": ".specify/governance/approval-flow.yaml",
"sha256": "5ee774fd595fae08429fa7832fccf1c3fa7b607446e5f8b602b36dfabedbe5b9"
},
{
"bytes": 2003,
"path": ".specify/governance/risk-registry.yaml",
"sha256": "a37a7eb3db26389f3bf024637ed88a95bf159beec0f60b25fa17c969bb762440"
},
{
"bytes": 1053,
"path": ".specify/agentops/metrics.yaml",
"sha256": "3b8b7d1b71dd654bf600c5366b012daf7dea6415e71b50688872526bfac5af33"
},
{
"bytes": 2308,
"path": ".specify/level5/tool-registry.yaml",
"sha256": "c7f0081617b754b84a70ee6386277f3e8cd827ba8685d0245bc2b4f979951837"
},
{
"bytes": 722,
"path": ".specify/level5/model-fallback.yaml",
"sha256": "731f98e9ca8182af9183de3711c0376c2e5daf38c769f27a5556d438aa53e2d7"
},
{
"bytes": 389,
"path": ".specify/level5/drift-policy.yaml",
"sha256": "e81ea7435052b1cfbb3d296789a8d6c8bd839675150298a879ad7f5f1d853312"
}
],
"generated_at": "2026-07-06T05:57:36Z"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
# CASAN H5 — Reviewer identity registry (Approval-identity MVP · C4).
#
# Binds an approver id to a ROLE and a PUBLIC key. Under CASAN_APPROVAL_STRICT=1,
# governance-check.sh trusts an approval ONLY if it is signed by the private key
# matching one of these public keys, and the reviewer's role is authorized for
# the action (see the `action` lines).
#
# Line format (no yaml dependency):
# reviewer <id> <role> <pubkey-file> # pubkey-file relative to reviewers/ dir
# action <action-name|default> <comma,roles>
#
# Reviewer PRIVATE keys live OFF-REPO (with the reviewer / issued by an IdP) —
# only PUBLIC keys are provisioned here, same policy as the audit signing key.
# Production: replace this static registry + local pubkeys with OIDC/JWT identity
# from a real IdP (verify token signature + role/exp claims).
reviewer security-lead security security-lead.pub.pem
reviewer tech-lead tech_lead tech-lead.pub.pem
reviewer ops-owner ops ops-owner.pub.pem
reviewer project-owner project_owner project-owner.pub.pem
# Which role may approve which action class.
action deploy ops,security
action migration tech_lead,security
action db_write tech_lead,security
action write_code tech_lead,security
action policy_change security
action default tech_lead,ops,security,project_owner